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ABSTRACT
This work applies geopolitical concepts to elucidate how geography, energy, and
rivalries among global powers affect the Azeri foreign policy. This research work uses a
deductive method of qualitative research and a longitudinal analysis of qualitative
variables.
This study first reviews the most significant academic works in the field to delineate
the framework of Azerbaijani foreign policy. Next, it discusses the geographical features of
the Azeri landlocked territory and its influence over foreign policy. Then the study presents
how Azerbaijan uses its energy as a leverage tool in its foreign policy. The fourth chapter
analyzes the current competition between two global powers, the US and Russia, for
influence over Azeri oil and gas resources, seeking to balance the power in the South
Caucasus and Central Asian regions.
Finally, this research work lists the findings, showing that the Azeri foreign policy is
affected by geography, energy, and global power competition variables. The transit states
that encircle the landlocked territory of Azerbaijan reduce the Azeri ability to export its
energy resources to international markets. The economic and political involvement of
foreign companies and states in the Azeri energy industry also reduces the economic and
political independence of Azerbaijan. The competition between the US and Russia for
influence over the Azeri territory and its energy resources also affects the foreign policy of
Azerbaijan. Thus, in order to achieve economic, political, and military stability, Azerbaijan
has to be constantly balancing regional and global powers.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Azerbaijan and Global Background
Two principal political and economic changes occurred in the last decades of the
20th century, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
As a result of those changes, the United States (US) consolidated its supremacy in the world
and Russia lost its status as a superpower. Since the competition between the US and the
Soviet Union was no longer possible, international institutions acquired more importance
in international affairs. The end of the bipolar world, however, did not represent a
complete change in the relationship among states in international politics because the
relationship between the US and the Western powers—such as Great Britain, France, and
Germany—remained virtually intact.1
The end of the Soviet Union consolidated the institution-building process designed
by the US at the end of the Second World War and defined the current global order.2
Washington created an economic, political, and legal framework for fluent interaction
between states and multilateral institutions in economic, political, and military affairs.3

The end of the Cold War has meant the end of the bipolar order and the containment of the Soviet Union.
The basic Western liberal principles and organizations endured and became more robust than before. John G.
Ikenberry, "The Myth of Postwar Chaos," Foreign Affairs 75 (1996): 79-91.
Democracies endured and even became more robust than before. John G. Ikenberry After Victory: Institutions,
Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press.
2000), 215.
2 Ikenberry, "Postwar Chaos," 79-91.
3 International organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the North American Free Agreement Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) reinforced the
new global economy, rule of law, and military order. John G. Ikenberry, "Globalization as American
Hegemony," In Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew:
1

1

Thus, international cooperation among states and institutions became the new common
practice for international relations. States were no longer unique actors in international
relations because globalization reshaped global political, economic, and military affairs.4
In recent decades, the intensification of the interconnection between economic,
ecological, political, and security affairs has affected the decision-making process in world
politics. Cooperation increased its importance as a tool to mitigate the contradictions of the
new global economy. In other words, societies constituted as nation-states are ‘opening’
themselves to an economically driven world society,5 where world connectivity and
interdependence are the most significant manifestation of the global economy.6
Under this framework, the Republic of Azerbaijan has become a critical country
where power competition between Western and non-Western states takes place. This work
attempts to explain how geographic features, energy resources, and global powers’
competition for influence in the region of Azerbaijan can affect the independence of Azeri
foreign policy.

(Cambridge: Polity, 2007): 41-61. John G. Ikenberry, "American Power and the Empire of Capitalist
Democracy." Review of International Studies 27 (2001): 191-212. Ikenberry, After Victory, 216.
4Globalization is “a process or set of processes which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of
social relations and transactions –assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impactgenerating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of
power.” David Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture (Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 1999), 16.
5 Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 61.
6This new economic and political approach claims that Western legal, economic, and military supremacy over
non-Western states is unparalleled. See: Sophie Bessis, Occidente y los Otros: Historia de una Supremacia
(Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2002), 17.
Cox, Robert. “Democracy in Hard Times : Economic Globalization and the Limits to Liberal Democracy.” In The
Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy, edited by Anthony McGrew
(London: The Open University Press, 1997),49.

2

1.1.1 Geography
Azerbaijan is a landlocked territory bordering Russia to the north, Iran to the south,
Armenia and Georgia to the west, and the Caspian Sea to the east. The Azeri region of
Nakhchevan is also landlocked, encircled by Iran to the south and west, Armenia to the
north and east, and Turkey to the northwest. The collapse of the Soviet Union presented a
new and complex reality for Azerbaijan, which left behind its Soviet history to become an
independent state, assuming economic and geopolitical challenges. Economically speaking,
Azerbaijan was not able to reduce its economic dependency from Russia when it became an
independent state due to its lack of infrastructure and industry. Under Soviet rule, Azerbaijan did
not develop either its national industry or alternative routes to transport its products, which
consolidated its economic dependency on the Soviet Union. The existing transport routes that
connect Azerbaijan with the outside world were in bad condition, and their lack of maintenance
increased the transport costs of the Azeri commodities to international markets. These unrepaired
highways connect the Azeri capital, Baku, with the Georgian port of Batumi in the Red Sea and
with the Russian Southern Federal District of Rostovna-Donu, which also has access to the Red
Sea through different Russians highways. The high cost of maintenance of the Azeri highways
and the region’s singular geographic features have limited the commerce between Azerbaijan
and the international world.7
The development of the railway in the late 19th Century represented an alternative to
transport Azeri freight to Georgia, Armenia, Russia, Turkey, and the Red Sea. During the Soviet
era, the railway gained more significance as the major transport system for people and goods.

7

Frederik Coene, The Caucasus: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2010), 21.
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However, the end of the Soviet Union and the constant military conflicts among the Caucasus
states reduced the transport of commodities by railway.8 For instance, a railway network that
runs from Azerbaijan to Armenia and then to Turkey is not currently operating due to the
economic blockade made by Azerbaijan against Armenia, in response to the military conflict
between the two countries over the Azeri territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.9 The collapse of the
Soviet Union also affected the commerce throughout railways between the South Caucasus states
and Russia, reducing the traffic and trade by almost 80 percent of the regular freight. After the
end of the Soviet Empire, Azeri authorities, multilateral development banks, and private
companies invested in the rehabilitation and maintenance of both transport systems, highways
and railways, due to their importance for Azeri economic development.
The geographical features of Azerbaijan and the other South Caucasus countries have
made a buffer zone for the Russian, Persian, and Ottoman empires. The economic, political, and
military ambition of those empires changed over time, and those changes influenced the current
South Caucasus states’ foreign policies. Azerbaijan, for instance, has been considered a
peripheral state within the Soviet centralized economic system, but its peripheral classification
changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union when Western states and private companies
became interested in the Azeri energy resources and its geostrategic location. The incursion of
these new players increased the great powers’ competition for influence, and it also reshaped the
foreign policy of Azerbaijan. The Azeri government had to deal with traditional powerful
neighbors—Russia, Iran, and Turkey—leading Azerbaijan to develop a more sophisticated
multilateral foreign policy to include the new economic, political, and military Western partners.
Coene, The Caucasus, 22.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict lasted from 1988 until 1994, leaving20,000 dead and over 1 million
refugees and displaced persons. Coene, The Caucasus, 145.
8
9
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The Azeri authorities found that cooperation was the key strategy to achieve national and
regional stability in the South Caucasus region, and they pursued a strategy of balancing global
and regional power competition
In geopolitical terms, Azerbaijan is crucial for regional and global powers. Halford
Mackinder stated that the world history is a struggle for power and for the dominance of
land and sea. Referring to Eurasia (the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions), he claimed
that land would predominate over sea, and it would be due to the importance of Eurasia as a
physical link between Europe and Asia, where significant natural resources and big populations
would ensure the economic and military development of the state that succeeds in dominating the
Eurasian region. The hegemonic position of a European or Asian state would be gained by
control of the Eurasian landmass.
According to Mackinder’s analysis, the geographic location of the Eurasian states has
been crucial for the expansionism of Western and Russian powers. Over time, these global
powers have increased and redefined their economic, political, and military interests over the
South Caucasus and Central Asian countries. The most recent approach made by the US and
Russia within these regions occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when both powers
began their competition for influence over Azeri energy resources. This competition for
influence, in a global perspective, represented an opportunity for the Azeri government to take
advantage of its geographical location to balance these two global powers.
Under the president Heydar Aliyev’s government, Azerbaijan attempted to reduce its
dependency on Russia by strengthening political, economic, and military ties with Western
countries, especially with the US. During Bill Clinton’s presidency, the American government
and the major American oil companies made significant investments in the oil and gas industry
5

of Azerbaijan, financing the development of new oil and gas pipelines, which run from
Azerbaijan to Western markets through Georgia and Turkey. This international partnership
sought to reduce the Azeri dependency on the Russian pipeline network by creating alternative
pipeline routes to export the Azeri energy resources to international markets. It also benefited
Western countries because they become new consumers of the Azeri oil and gas, and it allowed
European states to diversify their energy suppliers, decreasing their energy dependency on
Russia and the Middle East.
The geographical location of the Azeri territory is not only a matter of American and
Russian competition for influence over Azerbaijan, but it is also a matter of regional struggle for
power between Turkey and Iran. Both countries have sought to improve their economic,
political, and military relations with Azerbaijan, using different means to ensure their economic
involvement in the Azeri energy industry. Turkey and Iran intensified their competition for
influence when the two major regional powers joined the US and Russian approach to the Azeri
energy resources, respectively. Since Turkey developed a pro-Western policy, the Turkish-Azeri
relationship is smoother and stronger than the Azeri-Iranian relationship. Turkey supported
Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict while Iran sided with Armenia, and the
political and military support strengthened Turkey-Azerbaijan relations and weakened
Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran. The pro-Western economic policy of Azerbaijan and Turkey
allowed them to materialize energy projects for the exploitation and commercialization of Azeri
oil and gas. Two of the most prominent industrial projects sponsored by the US government and
the major Western oil companies in the South Caucasus region were the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline. These pipelines diversified
the Azeri oil and gas routes by transporting its energy resources from the Caspian Sea to
6

international markets through Georgia and Turkey. The development of these alternative routes
to the existing Russian oil and gas pipelines decreased the Azeri economic dependency on
Russia, and it also represented an opportunity to reduce the impact that geography has over the
landlocked territory of Azerbaijan.
In addition to the global and regional powers’ interests in the Azeri geographical location,
Azerbaijan has dealt with the challenges that its neighbor states, Georgia and Armenia, represent
for Azeri economic development. The geographical position of Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus
reduces the Azeri chances of becoming a fully independent state in political and economic terms.
As a landlocked territory, Azerbaijan had to negotiate possible outlets to the sea with Georgia
and Armenia, which became transit states for Azeri energy resources. Even though Armenia
represented an excellent candidate for becoming an official transit state for the Azeri oil and gas,
due to its proximity to Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea, Azerbaijan chose Georgia after the
military confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Azeri region of NagornoKarabakh.
Most of the Western countries supported the Azerbaijan-Georgia partnership in the
commercialization of the Azeri energy resources. Georgia, once it became an independent state,
developed a pro-Western foreign policy, which helped it to gain strategic allies in the Western
hemisphere. Georgia became an important link between Western states and Azerbaijan, and it
allowed the Azeri government to gain economic benefits from the Western powers, especially
from the US and the EU. Military conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan increased the political and
economic instability in the South Caucasus region, and these states have attempted to reduce this
instability by increasing their security through partnerships with Western powers.

7

In the case of Georgia, Georgian authorities sought to consolidate economic, political,
and military ties with the US, showing its pro-Western tendencies, which created concerns
within Russia. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, did not go as far as Georgia did regarding its
Western partnerships. Azerbaijan improved its political and economic relationship with the US,
but it also sought to strengthen its political and economic ties with Russia, seeking to balance
both global powers to Azerbaijan’s benefit.
In brief, the geographical features of Azerbaijan have played an important role in Azeri
economics, politics, and defense. On one side, the landlocked territory of Azerbaijan has limited
its economic and political development due to its lack of outlets to international seas, increasing
the influence of Russia and its South Caucasus neighbors over Azeri policies. On the other hand,
the location of Azerbaijan increases the interests of Western powers to exploit and
commercialize the Azeri energy resources, and it represented an opportunity for Azerbaijan to
commercialize its oil and gas to international markets regardless the Azeri geographical factors.
The conjunction of these two factors (the limitations and the opportunities produced by
landlocked features of the Azeri territory) affected the foreign policy of Azerbaijan on different
levels. Therefore, the Azeri government realized that its geographical constraints could only be
overcome by developing a multi-vector policy10 based on multiple pipelines, 11 which would

The “multi-vector foreign policy” is a Russian phrase used to describe the balance of power. The Balance of
power seeks to ensure equilibrium of power in which case no one state is threatened by a hegemonic state.
Although the balance of power seeks to prevent rise of a hegemon state, it does not mean that states follow
anti-hegemonic alliances because there would be the case where two sets of alliances will become a
competing alliances that establish a balance of power, as Richard Little argues. Within the realism tradition,
Classic Realism claims that the state as the key actor in international politics must pursue power. Hans J.
Morgenthau argues, “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” and that struggle has its
roots in human nature (competition, fear and war). On the other hand, Structural Realism argues that it is not
human nature but the anarchical system that creates insecurity in the international politics. Structural
realists believe that security/power competition depends on the lack of predominant authority above states.
Kenneth Waltz claims that states are security maximizers because their major concern is not power but
10

8

increase the Azeri economic possibilities to become a more independent country in a region
where global powers compete for influence.

1.1.2 Energy
As the previous section described at length, Azerbaijan is a landlocked territory, with
energy resources that are exported through Georgia and Turkey to reach international markets.
The transportation of the Azeri oil and gas has increased the power of these transit states over the
Azeri foreign policy.12 Georgia became a key element within the Azeri and Western states’
energy businesses, especially since the Azeri government and Western oil companies decided to
build oil and gas pipelines that would avoid Armenian territory due to the Azeri-Armenian
military confrontation over Nagorno-Karabakh. These pipeline projects positively affected the
Georgian economy, decreasing Georgia’s energy dependency on Russia. Azerbaijan became an
energy supplier of Georgia, the US, and European states. It encouraged some Europeans to
speculate about the possibility of including Georgia in NATO, and Georgia, as a transit state,
obtained economic revenues for the transit fee of the Azeri oil and gas. Under these
circumstances, the Azeri government developed and strengthened economic and political ties

security. John Mearsheimer, on the other hand, disagrees with Walt’s theoretical approach, claiming that an
anarchical system encourages states to maximize their relative power position. This approach, called
offensive realism, highlights that states are constantly seeking to gain power at the expense of other states,
and it means that global power completion will be the rule in the international system where there would not
be a global hegemon. Little, Richard. The balance of power in International relations. Metaphors, myths and
models. (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 4 Dunne, Tim, and Brian C Schmidt. "Realism." In The
Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations, edited by John Baylis, Steve Smith
and Patricia Owens. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.106
11 Avinoam Idan and Brenda Shaffer, “The Foreign Policies of Post-Soviet Landlocked States,” Post-Soviet
Affairs 27 (2011): 241-68.
12 Idan and Shaffer, “Post-Soviet Landlocked States,” 241.
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with Georgia in order to ensure transportation of its energy resources to international markets
through Georgian territory.
In addition, Azerbaijan found a second crucial economic partner in Turkey, which
became a transit state for the Azeri oil and gas sold to Western countries. The geographical
location of Turkey is decisive for Azeri economic interests, especially since Azerbaijan has
no outlet to the sea, while Turkey, located in the Mediterranean Sea, has direct access to the
Western markets. The Azeri-Turkish relations reinforced Baku independence from
Moscow, and they increased the Azeri-Turkish economic interdependence since part of the
oil and gas that Azerbaijan exports through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the
Baku-Tbilisi- Erzurum gas pipeline satisfies the Turkish local consumption,13 expanding the
distribution of Azeri energy resources to regional and global markets.
In a global context, Azeri energy resources are essential for global powers and
European states, which have been seeking to decrease their energy dependency on Russia
and the Middle East. This reality created an excellent opportunity for the Azeri government
to trade its oil and gas with Western states, which have been attempting to diversify their
energy suppliers. The commercialization of the Azeri energy resources to Western markets
has decreased the Russian influence over Western countries due to the loss of Russia’s
monopoly of the gas supply to Western states.
Russia increased its concern over Azerbaijan when the American government and
private companies participated actively in the trade and exploitation of the Azeri energy

It allows Turkey to diversify its oil and gas dependence from Libya and Russia respectively. Ali
Karaosmanoglu. “Turkey’s Objectives in the Caspian Region,” In The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, ed.
Gennady Chufrin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 153.
13
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resources. Since then, Russian authorities have been very active dealing with Azeri leaders
in order to maintain Russia’s predominant position as a hegemonic power in the South
Caucasus region.
The US, on the other hand, has watched closely the political, economic, and military
development of Azerbaijan and Georgia since they became independent states. The initial
American approach to Azerbaijan reflected the economic interests that the Western oil
companies had in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Once these
companies obtained data about the size of the Azeri energy resources, they decided to
invest millions of dollars to exploit and transport the Caspian oil and gas to international
markets. The magnitude of the investment and the geopolitical features of Azerbaijan
persuaded the US government to get involved in the negotiation of the different oil and gas
pipelines that would take the Azeri energy resources to international markets.14
Washington realized that the development of oil and gas pipelines that avoid Russian and
Iranian territories would decrease the influence of these two states in the South Caucasus.
It would also allow the Western states to decrease their energy dependency from Russia.
Thus, Azeri energy resources play a crucial role in determining the foreign policy of
Azerbaijan, especially since global and regional powers compete for influence over Azeri
energy resources.

Ehsan Ahrari. “The Strategic Future of Central Asia: A View from Washington,” Journal of International
Affairs 56 (2003): 157-166.
14
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1.1.3 Competition among Powers
In the early 1990’s, the territorial and ethnic conflict in the Azeri region of NagornoKarabakh affected the political and economic stability of Azerbaijan.15 This instability
represented an opportunity that allowed Western states to get involved in a military
conflict within the Russian sphere of influence through the internationalization of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.16 After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
Washington reinforced its participation in the South Caucasus region by seeking access to
military facilities to conduct military attacks over Afghan territory during the War on
Terror.
Russia and Western powers have competed for influence in the South Caucasus
region, and Azerbaijan represented the key state for this competition due to the Azeri
geographical location and energy resources. The competition among global powers over
Azerbaijan has followed two different perspectives: the American and the Russian. Under
the American perspective, Washington has attempted to reduce Russian influence over the
South Caucasus and Central Asian regions, reduce the EU dependence on Russian energy
supply, spread politically and economically liberal values in the region, and increase the
American influence in Azerbaijan through economic and military support. On the other

Gayane Novilova, “Unresolved Conflicts in the Regional Security System: The Case of the South Caucasus,”
Transition Studies Review 11 (2004): 213-23.
16 Alexander Krylov, “The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict,”. in The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, Gennady
Chufrin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 281-94. Dina Malysheva, “The Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh:
Its Impact on Security in the Caspian Region,”. In The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, ed. Gennady Chufrin
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 257-80. Sabit Bagirov. “Azerbaijan’s Strategic Choice in the Caspian
Region,” In The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, ed. Gennady Chufrin (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), 178-94. Alexander Rondeli, “The Choice of Independent Georgia,” In The Security of the Caspian Sea
Region, ed. Gennady Chufrin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 195-211.
15
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hand, the Russia has sought to consolidate its position as a superpower, increase Russian
influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions, discourage NATO expansion in
the South Caucasus region, and take part in the Azeri energy business to improve Russia’s
status as a major energy supplier.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan sought to increase its economic
and military independence from Russia, seeking partnerships with Western states,
especially with the US. Azeri authorities noticed that by balancing the US and Russia,
Azerbaijan would be able to achieve political, economic, and military stability in the South
Caucasus region. The global powers’ competition for influence over Azerbaijan would play
in favor of Azeri interests, but it also would affect the economic development of Azerbaijan
whether Russia and the US plays against Azerbaijan. Therefore, the Russian and American
foreign policies in the South Caucasus are determining factors for Azerbaijan’s foreign
policy.

1.2 Thesis
The economic repercussions for landlocked states is a topic widely developed in the
political science field, but the potential influence of the landlocked geographic condition in
foreign policy is still an undeveloped subject. 17 The existence of substantial energy
resources would likely increase the wealth and independence of any state, but in the case of
Azerbaijan its geographic features, as a landlocked state, affect its political and economic
independence. Since energy resources became crucial commodities for industrialized

17

Idan and Shaffer, “Post-Soviet Landlocked States,” 24.
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countries, global powers are likely to ensure the supply of oil and gas for their
consumption. In addition to these two variables (geography and energy), the competition
among global powers for influence over Azerbaijan is another variable to consider in the
analysis of the independence of Azeri foreign policy. Thus, this thesis attempts to show the
pragmatic face of Azeri policy by explaining Azerbaijan’s energy resources and landlocked
geography make it dependent on regional neighbors for trade and a target for exploitation
by Russia and the West. Azerbaijan has managed to both profit from its resources by
selling to both the US and Russia, and Baku uses this balance to hold back attempts by
either major power to exert too much control over Azeri governance.”

1.3 Significance of Research
Recent works on the South Caucasus and Central Asia have attempted to explain the
economic importance of geopolitics to decision makers, but they did not examine how
independent Azeri foreign policy can be despite its landlocked geography. This work
attempts to explain how the landlocked feature of Azerbaijan affects the independence of
its foreign policy. To develop a more complete analysis of this claim, this study accounts for
energy resources and global powers’ competition for influence in Azerbaijan. Thus, this
study’s claims attempt to define the current importance of geography, energy, and the
global powers’’ competition for influence over Azerbaijan to determinate how these factors
affect the independence of Azeri foreign policy.
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1.4 Research Question, Variables, and Hypothesis

1.4.1 Research Question
How do geography, energy, and global powers’ competition for influence over Azerbaijan
affect the independence of Azerbaijan's foreign policy?

1.4.2 Variables
This work analyzes three different variables: geography, energy, and global powers’
competition. The first variable refers to Azerbaijan’s landlocked geography. The
geographic location of Azerbaijan can affect its foreign policy in the long run. States without
sea outlets might struggle to keep their economic independence by comparison to states
with sea outlets. Transit states might take advantage of their geographic location to achieve
economic and political benefits from landlocked states. Thus, the landlocked states have to
develop a pragmatic foreign policy, seeking to meet the transit states’ claims and balance
the power of those transit states.
The second variable analyzes the influence that the energy resources have in Azeri
foreign policy. The energy resources have the capability to intensify the political instability
of any region, as has happened in the South Caucasus. The controversy over the oil and gas
routes that transport Azeri energy resources to Western markets increased the
competition among the regional states and global powers. Thus, the evaluation of the
impact that Azeri natural resources have in Azeri foreign policy is a crucial matter in order
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to elucidate whether energy resources can increase or decrease the independence of Azeri
foreign policy.
The last variable analyzes the competition of global powers—the US and Russia. The
relationships between these powers and Azerbaijan vary according to their own interests.
The US seeks to increase its influence over Azerbaijan in economic and military aspects.
The American participation in the trade of the Azeri energy resources decreases the
Russian position as an energy supplier of Western states. It also increases Azeri economic
independence from Russia, providing more influence to the US over the Azeri politics. In
the Russian case, Moscow would attempt to maintain its status as hegemonic regional
power over its sphere of influence, the former Soviet Republics. Russia also would oppose
NATO expansion into the South Caucasus states, using military actions if needed, as
happened in August 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia. Therefore, by analyzing
geography, energy, and global powers’ competition variables, this study attempts to
elucidate the degree of independence of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy.

1.4.3 Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this research proposes that the landlocked features of Azerbaijan,
its energy resources, and the global powers’ competition for influence over the South
Caucasus region affect Azerbaijan's foreign policy.
The first factor, Azerbaijan’s landlocked geography, potentially alters Azeri foreign
policy. Since transit states play a key role for any landlocked state, the latter finds some
constrictions to develop an independent foreign policy. Three of the four states that
16

surround the Azeri territory can provide an outlet for Azeri natural resources. These states
are Russia in the north, Iran in the south, and Georgia in the West. Russia and Iran have a
developed energy industry with oil and gas pipeline networks to transport the Caspian
energy resources to world markets by carrying or swapping them. However, Baku chose
Georgia as a transit state for its oil and gas due to political and security factors.
The energy resource, the second factor, is critical to understanding how Azerbaijan
has developed its foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Azeri authorities
have sought to strengthen Azeri political and military independence from Russia through
the exportation of its energy resources to Western markets using new pipelines. Azeri oil
and gas became a tool to increase Baku’s leverage in the South Caucasus. However, the
Azeri energy resources increased the Russian and Western states’ interests in the
exploitation and commercialization of the Azeri oil and gas.
Finally, the third factor explains the competition between global powers for
influence over Azerbaijan. Although Azerbaijan gained its independence in 1991, it did not
materialize entirely in economic, political, and security fields, especially since Russia
considers the Caucasus region its sphere of influence. The presence of Western powers
reduces Russian leverage in economic and security fields. The Western states’ involvement
in the South Caucasus region increases Azeri economic, political, and military
independence from Russia, and it strengths Western influence over Azerbaijan and the
other Caspian and Central Asian states.
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1.5 Methodology
This work applies geopolitical concepts to analyze the degree of independence of
Azeri foreign policy based on geography, energy, and competition among global powers.
This study uses a deductive method of qualitative research to evaluate the hypotheses in
different chapters. Each chapter follows a longitudinal analysis of qualitative variables,
using historical data analysis in order to provide a historical framework of the South
Caucasus region and Azerbaijan.
The first chapter reviews the most significant academic works in the field in order to
delineate the political framework of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. The second chapter
discusses how the Azeri territorial features, as a landlocked state, have played a key role in
the development of Azeri foreign policy. The lack of sea outlets has affected Azeri
international relations with its neighbors, forcing Baku to maintain strong relations with
the transit states that encircle Azerbaijan. This landlocked feature of Azerbaijan allowed it
to balance regional and global powers’ interests in the South Caucasus region. The Western
states’ interests in Azeri energy resources have increased Azeri leverage to deal with nonWestern states such as Russia and Iran. Thus, this chapter explores and discusses the
geographical advantages and disadvantages of the Azeri location in regard to its foreign
policy, analyzing the features of Azerbaijan as a landlocked territory.
Since the world is under a global transformation in terms of extensity, intensity,
velocity, and impact, the exploitation and commercialization of energy resources became a
significant source of wealth and conflict. The third chapter discusses the implications of
Azeri energy, highlighting the importance of alternative oil and gas pipeline routes to
18

transport Azeri oil and gas, reducing its dependency from transit states, especially Russia.
This chapter also presents how Azerbaijan has used its energy resources as a tool of
influence in its relationship with Western and non-Western powers. This proved to be a
pragmatic policy developed by the Azeri government to deal with global powers.
The fourth chapter analyzes the current competition between global powers, the US
and Russia, for influence over Azerbaijan due its oil and gas resources. The Azeri
government has balanced the US and Russia in order to gain more political, economic, and
security stability to develop its economy. This policy based on a balance of powers also
allowed Azerbaijan to gain influence in the Caspian and Central Asia regions.
Finally, the chapter five summarizes the main conclusions of each chapter,
highlighting the necessity of a pragmatic foreign policy in this region due to geography,
energy, and competition among global powers. To illustrate how independent Azeri foreign
policy is, it is necessary to explain how the existing interaction between geopolitics, energy
trade, and global powers’ competition for influence in Azerbaijan works in order to
understand of how those factors can affect Azeri foreign policy.

1.6 Literature Review
In recent decades, the intensification of economic, political, cultural, and military
affairs has affected decision-making processes in world politics. The increase of world
connectivity and interdependence in the global economy18 goes along with the growing of
global threats, such as terrorism groups, separatist movements, climate change, energy
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scarcity, and religious fundamentalism. In a semi-anarchic system, every state seeks to
ensure its national unity and interests through alliances or self-help policies, 19 taking into
consideration how some geographical features might affect the national security of each
state. Since states’ security depends on controlling territorial borders, pursuing control of
resources, and securing trade routes with centers of resources,20 geography is a defining
factor for understanding how the distribution of power between states affects the foreign
policy of any state. Geography provides a theoretical framework to understand the physical
composition of some regions and how political institutions interact in those regions.
Geography plays a key role in the design of foreign policy despite the determinist
features assigned by some political scientists. Under the determinist point of view, some
regions are richer in natural resources than others, and those resources influence the
distribution of power between states. It means that the course of history and its future are
based on geographic causes, which cannot be fully changed by human beings.
Technological advances might help human beings to modify some geographic features of
specific places, but it would not change the major geological characteristics of any region.
Although the use of technology seeks to connect distant places, making them more
accessible for human beings and trade and changing the value of these specific locations, it
does not mean that technology reduces the importance of geography.

Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, "Realism," in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to
International Relations, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press,
2008), 92-94.
20 Grygiel defines geography as “a combination of immutable geological facts (such as patterns of lands, seas,
rivers, mountain ranges, and climatic zones) and the human capacity to adapt to them through changes in
production and communications technology.” Jakub J. Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change (John
Hopkins University Press, 2006), 1.
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The natural scientific approach, followed by Halford Mackinder, claims that
geography determines the fate of nations with a limited input of human actions.21
Mackinder highlights the importance of the natural resources of the Eurasian region
(Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia), claiming that the future world power
will belong to the state that controls Eurasia. As Grygiel points outs, Mackinder’s analysis
states that the geographic location of Eurasia is what determines its importance,
reinforcing the natural scientific argument that geographic reality remains unaltered.
However, this theoretical approach changed when geography, as a determinist
feature of international analysis, lost its position as the explanatory variable in politics, and
it became one variable among others that influence power. 22 Thus, under the Classic
Realist’s perspective, power replaced geography as the independent variable in
international relations, and geography became an irrelevant explanatory variable. This
affirmation lies in the realist principle that states, as the main political actor in world
politics, expand when they have power and when no other state is capable of limiting the
expansion. Therefore, geography is no longer a source of power, because human beings,
through technological advances, are able to reduce the impact that geography has in
foreign policy.
By the early 1960s geography moved from natural science to social science,
highlighting the ability of people and states to overcome the geographical restrictions
created by nature. This shift decreased the determinist nature assigned to geography
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regarding the importance of geography in the analysis of foreign affairs. The realist
perspective also argues that distance, as a geographic feature, is no longer a variable that
decreases or increases human or state power in international politics, because power
defines the capacity of each state to face world politics, especially since new technologies
increased the capacity of states to project power to any remote area without decreasing
effectiveness.23
A third perspective about geography’s role in foreign affairs includes defensive and
offensive realists' perception. Since states do not interact in an abstract world but in a real
one, geographical distance and location matter. Therefore, political scientists have to
analyze how geography affects states’ interaction. Policy makers have to include geography
as a potential variable to evaluate their political, economic, and military calculations in the
design of a national geo-strategy. It means that geography affects foreign policy in a
peculiar fashion, especially since distance affects the perception of threat. Indeed,
geographical distance between states does not necessarily isolate states from possible
military confrontations with other states that are distant from the zone of conflict. In recent
decades the increasing demand of energy recourses, for example, has increased the
possibility of military confrontations in different zones.24
Mackinder wrote some of the initial works on geopolitics at the beginning of the
20th century. His theory states that world history is a struggle for the dominance of land
and sea. He argues that dominance over land is more significant than dominance of the sea,

Grygiel, Great Powers, 13.
Beyond financing wars, energy resources have become a motive of several wars in the 1990s, as is the case
in the Iraq-Kuwait War in 1990 and West Africa. Philippe Le Billon, "The Geopolitical Economy of "Resource
of Wars," Geopolitics 9 (2004): 1.
23
24

22

referring to the Eurasian region. The territory that links Europe and Asia, Eurasia, has
enough natural resources and population to provide hegemonic power to the state that
controls that region.25 Although Mackinder’s concepts were applied to a wider geographic
area than the South Caucasus, which he named the Heartland (Eurasia), this research
employs Mackinder's concepts to analyze the foreign policy of Azerbaijan in the South
Caucasus region.
Mackinder’s work on geopolitics, The Geographical Pivot of History, delivered in
1904, described the British anxiety about its imperial future in the 20th century. He stated
that “the development and expansion of railway networks had shifted the balance of power
away from sea faring imperial nations—most obviously Britain—toward nations that were
better positioned to exert land-based authority over continental interiors . . . whichever
power controlled the world’s landmasses would henceforth have access to the vast and
largely untapped resource wealth of the continental interiors.” 26 For Mackinder, Eurasia
was the geographic area that all the global powers attempted to control due to its strategic
relevance for trade and security between Western and Asian civilizations. In late 1837, the
Russian advance in Central Asia represented the first hostile action between these two
imperial powers. 27
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Mackinder depicts three main aspects of the Heartland: control of resources,
transportation infrastructure, and inaccessibility. 28 Eurasia’s natural resources were
relevant since the late 1890's, when Western powers became aware of the importance of
Azeri energy resources, and they discussed the Black Sea-Azerbaijan-Caspian Sea corridor.
The political and economic influence over Azeri natural resources is still a matter of
competition between global powers. Coene states that in the case of infrastructure for
transportation,29 railways played a crucial role for trade during the late 1890's and early
1900's. Those routes allowed Eurasian countries to develop their agricultural,
manufacturing, pastoral, and mining industries.30 In late 1800, the first oil companies
showed their interests in Azeri oil, which emerged as a valuable commodity during that
time. Since then, states and private companies have sought to improve the infrastructure of
the Azeri energy industry to exploit and trade its oil and gas.
According to David Hooson, the South Caucasus increased its importance due to
existing energy resources, terrorist groups, and ethnic conflicts. These factors have made it
difficult to forecast the future of Azerbaijan.31 As Mackinder showed one hundred years
ago, the Azeri energy resources have been a key factor for global powers in the struggle to
control Central Asia and the Caucasus regions. The oil and gas reserves found in Azerbaijan
and the other Caspian states highlighted the significance of the region for commerce and
security. On the other hand, international terrorism has become a new political, economic,
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and military factor for strengthening cooperation among Russia, the US, the EU, Turkey,
South Caucasus state, and Central Asian countries, renewing the importance of Eurasia.
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CHAPTER TWO: GEOGRAPHY
2.1 Geography and Geopolitics in International Relations
The South Caucasus called “lands in-between,”32 as a corridor between Europe and
Asia, has connected the Black and Caspian Seas for centuries, showing the cultural link
between Western and Asian civilizations, the religious encounter between Christianity and
Islam, and the trade link between the West and East. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia are
the three former Soviet republics that belong to the South Caucasus region. After the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan and Georgia attempted to enhance their economic,
political, and military independence from Russia, and they began a multi-vector foreign
policy in order to balance power in the region against Russia. In the early 1990s, Western
states increased their interest in the South Caucasus states, specifically for geographic,
energy, and security reasons. Armenia became a pro-Russian state, gaining military,
political, and economic support from Russia while Azerbaijan and Georgia, which have
faced different ethno-political conflicts, became pro-Western states. 33
As a landlocked nation, Azerbaijan has attempted to create robust and friendly
relations with all its neighbors, except with Armenia due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
in order to have alternatives routes to export its energy resources through transit states,
such as Georgia, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. The pro-Western Azeri foreign policy, however,
made possible the construction of new pipeline routes, which run from Baku to Tbilisi
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(Georgia), then to Ceyhan (Turkey), and finally to Western markets through the
Mediterranean Sea.34
Azeri oil and gas resources increase the global and regional power interests in
Azerbaijan, decreasing Azerbaijan’s landlocked geographic constrictions. Access to Azeri
energy resources produce four outcomes: 1) it allows Western states to diversify their
energy suppliers; 2) it increases the American influence over European and South Caucasus
states; 3) it compels Russia to redesign its energy policy with Azerbaijan; and 4) it
increases Iranian interests in the commercialization of the Azeri energy resources. It seems
that Azeri oil and gas are capable bringing regional and global powers to compete for
influence, and it allows the Azeri government to balance power in the South Caucasus
region. The four outcomes also imply that military confrontations might be expected in the
South Caucasus region.
In the geopolitical field, a number of new studies have investigated how the
landlocked feature of Azerbaijan affects Azeri foreign policy. 35 As Idan and Shaffer’s
analysis demonstrates, Azerbaijan follows a multi-directional foreign policy characterized
by the cooperation with Russia (e.g. keeping a Russian strategic radar station in Qabala)
and with the US (e.g. taking an active role in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program).
Azerbaijan is also a member of several strategic-international institutions, 36 showing its
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awareness of the important role of cooperation with global and regional organizations to
achieve stability in the South Caucasus.
The geographic location of Azerbaijan increases the chances of a military
confrontation in the South Caucasus region, where global powers are competing for
influence. In the case of the Western powers, the geographic distance between those states
and Azerbaijan is broad enough to assume that Western states are unlikely to participate in
a war in the South Caucasus on a regular basis because Western states have no territory at
risk. Nevertheless, it is likely that Western states might take part in any military
confrontation where their energy supplies from Azerbaijan or Caspian states are affected.
For that reason, global powers would not limit their political, economic, and military
intervention to their home territory but to other geographical locations where energy
resources are held. It shows that geographical areas rich in natural resources would not
remain isolated because the current geographical extension of any state is not limited to its
home territory but in fact extends beyond to where vital resources are located. In the Azeri
case, the geographical features of Azerbaijan affect the balance of power between the US
and Russia, opening the possibility of future confrontations between Azerbaijan and its
neighbor states.
The dynamics created by the combination of energy resources and landlocked
geography strengthen the argument that geographical features37 affect the balance of
power and create the scenery for possible military confrontations where global and
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regional powers take part in order to defend their national interests, in this case energy
consumption.

2.2 Geopolitics in International Relations
The geographical location of Azerbaijan38 imposes serious constraints on the Azeri
government’s ability to design a predictable foreign policy. The Azeri borders with Russia in the
North, Iran in the South, Armenia and Georgia in the West, and the Caspian Sea in the East
elucidate the complex relationships that Azerbaijan has created with its neighbor states. Azeri
leaders realized that the balance of power between global and regional powers is a pragmatic
strategy to achieve political, economic, and military stability in the region. Azerbaijan did not
design an ideological foreign policy as many buffer states did during and after the Second World
War. Instead, it designed a pragmatic one that took advantage of Azerbaijan’s geography and
energy resources and of global powers’ competition for influence.
The rising demand for energy resources in recent decades increased the importance of
Azeri oil and gas for Western and Non-Western industrialized states. The newly exploited Azeri
oil and gas fields and the modern routes (the BTC and BTE pipelines) have persuaded global
powers to take part in the commercialization and exploitation of the Azeri energy resources. In
the early 20th century, Mackinder claimed that Eurasia39 has the potential to develop the major
industrial power in the world due to the size of the population and the natural resources located
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in Eurasia. He argued that the nation, which controls Eurasia would be able to build an
incomparable military force to ensure its hegemonic position in the world.40
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has been redesigning its foreign policy,
seeking to avoid the ascending of any hegemonic state in Eurasia. The American approach to this
region has been less confrontational, seeking to spread American influence in former Soviet
Republics of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Within the American strategy fitted
Azerbaijan, whose geographical location and energy resources were crucial for Western
interests. Since Azerbaijan was not able to reduce the Russian influence as a regional and global
power in the South Caucasus, the Azeri government persuaded Western powers and investors
to participate in the Azeri energy business, ensuring profitable gains in the exploitation of
Azeri oil and gas and their export to Western markets. Western involvement in the Azeri
energy industry would ensure the transportation of energy to international markets
through the construction of pipelines, highways, and other communication networks. This
pro-Western policy increased the political stability, economic development, and military
security of Azerbaijan in recent decades, regardless of Russian complaints and concerns
about the Azeri-American relationship.
Within the geopolitical issues that affect international relations in the South
Caucasus region, territorial conflicts have altered the development of energy centers and
pipelines routes in Azerbaijan. The military conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over
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the Nagorno-Karabakh region41 in the early 1990’s changed the initial Azeri plans to
develop an oil pipeline that would have run Azeri oil from Azerbaijan through Armenia and
Turkey. After the conflict, Azeri authorities chose Georgia as a transit state for its oil and gas,
seeking to ensure the continuous supply of the energy to international markets. This strategic
change, however, increased the cost of the pipelines. The territorial conflict in NagornoKarabakh remains unsolved, and Armenians fear that Azeri authorities might be prolonging
the unresolved conflict to rebuild the Azeri military capabilities for future confrontations.
Some speculate that Azerbaijan intends to begin a military attack on Armenia should Baku
not succeed in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations with Yerevan.42 Armenians and Azeri
are suspicious of one another, and they have been equipping their military forces to protect
their national interests.43
Since geopolitical factors change, states are continuously adapting themselves to the
new centers of resources, as happened after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this regard,
Azerbaijan became a new energy center in a region where Russia was the hegemonic state
in the trade and production of oil and gas. In the 1990's, Caspian oil and gas gained
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importance in the world, which created the opportunity for a possible change in the
balance of power in Eurasia after the Russian withdrawal of the former Soviet republics.
Once Azerbaijan became a new center of energy resources, the Azeri government
developed new routes to transport its oil and gas to international markets. 44 The location
and transportation of Azeri energy became the main reason for Western states’
involvement in Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus. The Azeri government developed a
foreign policy balancing regional and global powers, seeking to keep regional stability,
economic development, and national security.
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CHAPTER THREE: ENERGY
3.1 Energy Background
Azeri geography is crucial for international energy interests. Azerbaijan supplies oil
and gas to Western markets through the transit states of Georgia and Turkey. Since
Azerbaijan is a landlocked state, transit states influence Azeri foreign policy, allowing Baku
to export its energy resources to international markets.45 While the last chapter talked
about the landlocked features and their impact on Azeri foreign policy, this chapter
analyzes how energy affects Azeri interaction in international politics.
Economic factors based on energy-related issues have strengthened the Azeri
relationship with its neighbor states and global powers. Georgia and Armenia, in a regional
perspective, have poor and undeveloped economies, and those states have seen the need to
transport Azeri natural resources as an economic opportunity to improve their fragile
economies. Georgia and Armenia, like many other former Soviet Republics, have depended
on Russia as an energy supplier and policy maker for decades, and the collapse of the Soviet
Union increased their uncertainty about their economic future. However, when Azerbaijan
became an independent state, the South Caucasus states realized the benefits they could
obtain by strengthening their economic ties with Azerbaijan. The Azeri neighbor states,
including Turkey, negotiated different possible routes with Azeri authorities to transport
Azeri oil and gas to Western markets. These states knew that they were key players within
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the Azeri energy projects, and it would allow these transit states to gain significant
economic revenues for the transit fee, improving their economic situations.46
Since energy is the most prominent resource and the hardest to ensure for
industrial purposes, global powers have been attempting to diversify energy suppliers to
meet their economic goals. The importance of oil and gas for industrialized states has
reached significant levels in the last two decades. In a global perspective, the Western
European states' energy dependency on Russian and Middle Eastern energy is a clear
example of the significance of Azeri oil and gas for Western markets. Azerbaijan’s energy
resources fit within Western economic interests because access to Azeri oil and gas
decreases the European states’ dependency on Russian energy and increases the US
influence in the South Caucasus region. It also decreases the Russian hegemonic position as
an energy supplier for European countries. Western states, for their part, collaborate
economically and politically with Azerbaijan, promoting democracy, rule of law, human
rights, conflict resolution campaigns, and free markets. Thus, energy is a major factor in
maintaining Azeri political, economic, and military stability, while also increasing its
independence by balancing regional and global powers in the South Caucasus region.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan became an energy exporter state,
making oil and natural gas exploitation its main source of income. Through the
participation of international oil companies, Azerbaijan developed different energy
projects to increase its oil and gas exploitation capacity. Azeri oil and gas runs through
modern pipeline networks, which take the Azeri energy from its offshore and gas fields in
Zeyno Baran and Robert A. Smith, “The Energy Dimension in American Policy towards the Black Sea
Region,” Southern European and Black Sea Studies 7 (2007): 265-74.
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the Caspian Sea and Azeri territory, respectively. By 2009, Azerbaijan was producing 1.3
percent of the oil47 in the world,48 with a reserves-to-production ratio of 18.6 years.49 It
also produced 0.5 percent of the natural gas of the world, possessing reserves for up to 88.8
years. 50
The Azeri Ministry of Industry and Energy is the government institution that
supervises the exploitation and administration of Azeri natural resources. To meet the
industrial and commercial demands of oil and gas, the Azeri government created the State
Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), which is responsible for the production of
Azeri oil and gas. SOCAR's participation in the production of energy includes other
industrial activities related to the operation of refineries, running national pipeline
systems, and the managing of the oil and gas imports and exports.
The largest Azeri hydrocarbon resource is the Chirag Guneshli (ACG) oil field,
located 100 km east of Baku, covering 432 square km. British Petroleum (BP) operates this
oil field, which produced almost 80 percent of the total Azeri oil output in 2010.51 The Shah
Deniz field, on the other hand, is an offshore natural gas field located in the southern part of
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48 This consumption includes inland demand plus international aviation and marine bunkers and refinery fuel
and loss. Consumption of fuel ethanol and biodiesel is also included.
49 Reserves-to-production (R/P) ratio – If the reserves remaining at the end of any year are divided by the
production in that year, the result is the length of time that those remaining reserves would last if production
were to continue at that rate.
50 All these statistics were taken from "BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2010," accessed on
February 20,2012,
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle800.do?categoryId=9037128&contentId=7068555
51 "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1.
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the Azeri Caspian Sea zone. It is the major Azeri natural gas field, and it is under BP
administration and operation. This field is 64 km southeast of Baku.52
Although SOCAR’s participation in the Azeri energy field is significant, Figure 1 and
Figure 2 show that the Azeri state company produces less than 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s
national resources while the international consortium produces the remaining 80
percent.53 These figures show that international oil companies are the leading exploiters of
Azeri energy resources, implying that foreign interests are part of Azeri energy
development.
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Figure 1: Oil production (annual in 1000 t)54

"Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1.
53 British Petroleum operates the AIOC consortium. "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy
Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012, http://www.eia.gov/countries/countrydata.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1.
54 Source: “Economics & Statistics, Oil Production” State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, accessed
June 25 2012, http://new.socar.az/socar/en/economics-and-statistics/economics-and-statistics/oilproduction.
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Figure 2: Gas production (annual in millions m3)55

These figures show that the Azeri government wants to consolidate its energy
industry in order to develop its economy and to ensure its security. The Azeri government
designed pro-Western routes to export its oil and gas to international markets to increase
its economic and energy independence from Russia.56 The Azeri authorities distanced
themselves from Moscow and became closer to the Western states, since some American
oil companies invested heavily in the Azeri oil industry. Washington authorities also got
involved in the Azeri energy business when they participated in the negotiations and
design of different pipeline projects to transport the Azeri oil and gas to international
markets, bypassing Russian territory, as is the case of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil
pipeline.57 Baku has developed a multi-vector foreign policy using multi-pipeline routes58

Source: “Economics & Statistics, Gas Production” State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, accessed
June 25 2012, http://new.socar.az/socar/en/economics-and-statistics/economics-and-statistics/gasproduction.
56 Eldar Ismailov and Vladimer Papava, “A New Concept for the Caucasus,” Southern European and Black Sea
Studies 8 (2008), 283-98.
57 Alexei Bogaturov, “The Time of Central Asia,” International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics,
Diplomacy & International Relations 51 (2005): 74-84.
58 Idan and Shaffer, “Post-Soviet Landlocked States,” 241-68.
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to export its oil and gas to international markets, balancing regional and global powers. The
Azeri government applied a pragmatic foreign policy, which did not follow ideological and
cultural tendencies.59 As Idan and Shaffer explain, Azerbaijan’s landlocked geography
resulted in a foreign policy that was multidirectional, that relied on multiple pipelines for
oil export, that implemented distinctive policies toward its transit states, and that treated
transportation as a major foreign policy issue.60
This multi-vector foreign policy was a response to the Azeri necessity of expanding
its energy export infrastructure. The Azeri foreign minister Elmar Mammadyarov has
stated that Baku has attempted to diversify its energy export capabilities. This claim
follows the ongoing Azeri energy export policy, which allows Baku to export its energy
resources from Baku to Georgia (Port of Supsa), to Russia (Novorossiyk), and to Iran (using
swaps).61 In addition to these energy outlets, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which
became operational in 2005, is the most significant route for transporting Azeri oil to
international markets. Thus, this multi-vector policy and multiple pipeline routes have
been successful for Azerbaijan because they increased the nation’s economic independence
and security in the South Caucasus regions by balancing the economic and political
interests of the regional and global powers.

Houman A. Sadri, Global Security Watch: The Caucasus States (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 53-55.
Idan and Shaffer, “Post-Soviet Landlocked States,” 254-55.
61 Idan and Shaffer, “Post-Soviet Landlocked States,” 258.
59
60
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3.2 Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines
Azerbaijan has a modern pipeline network to export its energy resources. The Azeri
oil infrastructure includes three different pipelines: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
(BTC), the Baku-Novorossiyk pipeline (BN), and the Baku-Supsa pipeline (BS), as Figure 3
shows. Azeri natural gas on the other hand, runs through three pipelines: the Baku-TbilisiErzurum or the South Caucasus pipeline (SCP), the Gazi-Magomed-Mozdok pipeline (GMM),
and the Baku-Astara pipeline (BA).

Figure 3: Oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan

3.2.1 Oil Pipelines
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, sponsored by the US government, provides
Azerbaijan significant economic and political independence from Russia because it avoids
Russian territory, taking the Azeri oil from Baku to Tbilisi, and then to the Ceyhan port in
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the Mediterranean Sea. 62 As a consequence of the Azeri-Turkish energy relationship, both
countries have strengthened their commercial ties. These nations have also strengthened
their relationship in other areas, including military support when Turkey supported
Azerbaijan in the Azeri-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. 63 This relationship has
also increased Baku’s independence from Russia by increasing the Azeri leverage in energy.
The BTC is a 1,768 km pipeline that runs through Azerbaijan (443 km), Georgia (249
km) and Turkey (1,076 km). It starts in the Sangachal terminal, located offshore in
southern Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea, and it finishes in the Ceyhan terminal at the
Turkish coast of the Mediterranean Sea. The British company BP operates this pipeline,
which started exporting oil with a capacity of 1.2 million bbl/d by July 2006. The BTC
exports about 80 percent of Azeri oil. Additionally, the BTC also transports Kazakh oil to
Western markets. Kazakh oil travels through the Caspian Sea in tankers to reach the Azeri
oil terminal in Sangachal near Baku, and then it runs through the BTC to Western
markets.64
The Baku-Novorossiysk (BN) pipeline runs from the Azeri Sangachal terminal in the
Caspian Sea to the Russian port Novorossiysk in the Black Sea. At 1336 km in length, it is
the second longest Azeri oil pipeline. The state oil company SOCAR operates this pipeline in

During Bill Clinton’s presidency, the US firmly opposed an alternative pipeline to transport Azeri oil,
especially if it had to go through Iranian territory. Marcus Menzel, Doomed to Cooperate?: American Foreign
Policy in the Caspian Region (Frankfurt Main: Peter Lang GmbH, 2003), 99-101.
63 Turkish officials have stated that “[Turkish] relations with Azerbaijan constitute the most important
strategic axis not only in the Caucasus but also in . . . [Ankara’s] entire foreign policy . . .” See: Saban Kardas,
“Turkish-Azerbaijan Energy Cooperation and Nabucco: Testing the Limits of the New Turkish Foreign Policy
Rhetoric,” Turkish Studies 12 (2011): 55-77. Turkey has provided military equipment and training for the
Azeri army. See: Emre Iseri and Oguz Dilek, “The Limitations of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Activism in the
Caucasian Regional Security Complexity,” Turkish Studies 12 (2011): 48.
64 "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1.
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the section that runs over Azerbaijan while Transneft operates the Russian section. BakuNovorossiysk has a capacity of 100,000 bbl/d.65
Finally, the Baku-Supsa (BS), which runs for 837 km, is the shortest Azeri oil
pipeline, and it runs from the Azeri Capital of Baku to the Georgian port Supsa in the Black
Sea. BP operates this pipeline on behalf of the AOIC members. The Baku-Supsa pipeline has
an estimated capacity of 145,000 bbl/d.66

3.2.2 Natural Gas Pipelines
The South Caucasus pipeline (SCP) or Baku-Tbilisi- Erzurum pipeline is a gas pipeline
which transports natural gas from the Azeri Shah Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea to
Georgia. Then it goes to its final destination in the Turkish city of Erzurum. This pipeline is
690 km long and runs parallel to the BTC oil pipeline. BP operates this gas pipeline and it
began exporting gas in 2007.67 The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline was
intended to supply natural gas to Turkey and Georgia exclusively, but there have been
some recent speculations about Azeri government interests in supplying gas to Western
markets through Turkey-Greece and Italy-Greece pipelines. However, BP closed the
pipeline for several days in August 2008 when Russia invaded the southern Georgian
region of South Ossetia. After the Russian-Georgian war ended, BP reopened the BTE.

"Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1.
66 "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1.
67 "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1.
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The Gazi-Magomed-Mozdok (GMM) pipeline runs from Azerbaijan to Russia, and
extends 241 km. This pipeline is part of a Russian and Azeri pipeline project that runs from
the Russian regions of Mozdok in North Ossetia, Chechnya, and Dagestan to the Azeri
capital of Baku. This pipeline became inactive when Azerbaijan became a natural gas
supplier. However, in 2008, the Russian energy company Gazprom decided to diversify its
imports of natural gas from the Azeri Shah Deniz gas field. In June 2009, the Russian
president Dmitry Medvedev and the Chairman of Gazprom, Alexey Miller, met with Illham
Aliyev, the president of Azerbaijan, in Baku to discuss energy projects between Gazprom
and SOCAR, including the recent Russian purchase of Azeri natural gas. The Russian and
Azeri authorities agreed to sign energy contracts over the existing pipeline infrastructure
and Azerbaijan would sell 500 million cubic meters annually to Russia.68 The GaziMagomed-Mozdok (GMM) pipeline, operated by SOCAR, began exporting natural gas to
Russia in 2010.69
The Baku-Astara (BA) pipeline originally built in 1965 as part of an energy
agreement made between Iran and the Soviet Union. Iran provided natural gas to the South
Caucasus states through this pipeline until the Iranian revolution cut off the energy
agreement. In 2006 Azerbaijan and Iran agreed to a swap where Azerbaijan provides
natural gas to northern Iranian through the Baku-Astara pipeline, and Iran supplies gas to
the Azeri enclave of Nakhchivan. Iran had to build a new gas pipeline with an extension of

“Gazprom and SOCAR Sign Agreement on Azerbaijani Gas Purchase and Sale Terms,” Gazprom, accessed
March 12, 2012, http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2009/june/article66713/.
69 "Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1.
68
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48 km to be able to supply natural gas to the Azeri enclave, and Azerbaijan is paying a 15
percent commission to Iran for transit fees.70

3.3 Oil and Natural Gas Imports and Exports71
Table 1 and Figure 4 illustrate Azerbaijan’s crude oil exports and their main destinations—
Italy, France, Israel and the US—during the period from 2005 to 2010. Azerbaijan exported
crude oil for a value of $44,171 million in 2008, which was the highest profit received in
those five years.
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Figure 4: Exports of petroleum crude oil—code 270972

"Azerbaijan: Country Analysis Brief," US Energy Information Administration, accessed February 20, 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AJ&trk=p1.
71 The data regarding imports and exports were extracted from the UN Trade Website. To obtain this
information, we selected the data reported by Azerbaijan between the years 2005 and 2010, for codes 2709,
2710, and 2711. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/databases.htm
72
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Table 1: Exports for petroleum crude oil—code 2709
Exports
Code 2709

2005
(MM$)

2006
(MM$)

2007
(MM$)

2008
(MM$)

2009
(MM$)

2010
(MM$)

Italy

$1,218

$2,443

$642

$19,011

$3,646

$6,904

France

$331

$334

$153

$2,281

$1,229

$1,839

Israel

$132

$574

$278

$3,418

$1,215

$1,745

Turkey

$63

$110

$839

$274

$0

$0

Indonesia

$0

$0

$390

$1,411

$661

$782

USA

$0

$75

$211

$5,972

$1,735

$1,703

Russian Federation

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$2,219

$3,848

$3,214

$44,171

$11,990

$18,490

79%

92%

78%

73%

71%

70%

World
These countries represent

The crude oil imported to Azerbaijan, by comparison, was not as significant as
Azerbaijan’s crude oil exports during the same period, as Table 2 and Figure 5 illustrate.
The main Azeri providers of crude oil were the United Kingdom and Austria during the
period between 2005 and 2010. However, these energy suppliers exported petroleum to
Azerbaijan in the relatively insignificant amount of $112,000. From 2006 to 2007,
Azerbaijan did not report any importation of crude oil.
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Figure 5: Imports of petroleum crude oil—code 270973
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Table 2: Imports of petroleum crude oil—code 2709
Imports
Code 2709

2005

United Kingdom

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

$11

$795

$127

Austria

$111679

U.S.

$522

Netherlands

$339

Turkey

$262

France

$1728

World

$127

These countries represent

100%

0

0

$112802

$1739

$795

100%

100%

100%

During the period between 2005 and 2010, Azerbaijan exported only petroleum to
five main destinations: Georgia, Turkey, Italy, Iran, and Malta. They did not import crude
oil during this period. Table 3 and Figure 6 illustrate the different export incomes that
Azerbaijan received during those five years, gaining the highest amount of income in 2008,
when Azerbaijan received $2.054 billion.
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Figure 6: Export of petroleum oils except crude—code 271074
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Table 3: Export of petroleum oils except crude—code 271075
Exports
Code2710

2005
(MM$)

2006
(MM$)

2007
(MM$)

2008
(MM$)

2009
(MM$)

2010
(MM$)

Georgia

$178

$229

$161

$341

$224

$275

Turkey

$139

$191

$133

$228

$61

$101

Iran

$76

$208

$340

$128

$20

$3

Italy

$71

$388

$284

$203

$129

$132

Greece

$46

$84

$115

$83

$34

$43

Malta

$42

$21

$118

$111

$83

$116

USA

$26

$19

$58

$18

$9

$1

Russian Fed.

$5

$2

$0

$0

$157

$12

$1,090

$1,505

$1,669

$2,054

$1,483

$1,284

53%

76%

72%

54%

48%

53%

World
These countries
Represent

All petroleum oil except crude imported by Azerbaijan was not as prominent as the
Azeri's exportation of the same commodity during the same period of time. Turkmenistan,
Belgium, Turkey, and Russia are the most significant and constant providers for the period
between 2005 and 2010, as Table 4 and Figure 7 illustrate. The highest level of importation
was in 2005, which reached $162 million.

Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, other than crude; preparations not elsewhere
specified or included, containing by weight 70% or more of petroleum oils or of oils obtained from
bituminous minerals, these oils being the basic con [HS2007 code 2710]
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Figure 7: Import of petroleum oils except crude—code 271076

Table 4: Import of petroleum oils except crude—code 2710
Imports
Code 2710

2005
(MM$)

2006
(MM$)

2007
(MM$)

2008
(MM$)

2009
(MM$)

2010
(MM$)

$140

$58

$21

$31

$13

$0

$10

$5

$7

$14

$8

$9

Belgium

$5

$12

$13

$20

$9

$15

Turkey

$2

$3

$5

$7

$9

$10

United Kingdom

$1

$2

$7

$7

$4

$6

USA

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$2

Turkmenistan
Russian
Federation

Italy
World
These countries
Represent

$0

$0

$3

$4

$4

$7

$162

$86

$64

$97

$54

$66

98%

93%

88%

87%

87%

77%

Between 2005 and 2010, Azerbaijan had three main destinations for its natural gas,
Georgia, Bulgaria, and Albania, as Table 5 and Figure 8 illustrate. However, Russia became
the major destination of the Azeri natural gas in 2010, buying almost $304 million worth of
Azeri gas.
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Figure 8: Export of natural gas in gaseous state—code 271177

Table 5: Export of natural gas in gaseous state—code 2711
Exports
Code 2711

2005
(MM$)

2006
(MM$)

2007
(MM$)

2008
(MM$)

2009
(MM$)

2010
(MM$)

Georgia

$2.5

$4.4

$19.9

$66.8

$125.8

$74.6

Bulgaria

$0.1

$2.8

$3.4

$8.7

$3.3

$5.7

Albania

$0.0

$0.6

$2.9

$8.3

$2.7

$6.8

Russian Federation

$0.1

$0.0

$0.0

$0.0

$0.0

$188.5

USA

$0.0

$0.0

$0.0

$0.0

$0.0

$0.0

World
These countries
represent

$3.4

$9.9

$26.3

$92.6

$131.8

$303.9

80%

80%

99%

90%

100%

91%

The amount of natural gas imported by Azerbaijan between 2007 and 2010 was not
as great as the Azeri's exportation of natural gas. The main Azeri suppliers of natural gas
during the years 2005 and 2006 were Turkmenistan, Russia, and Kazakhstan, as Table 6
and Figure 9 illustrate. The peak of importation was in 2006, which reached $465 million.
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Figure 9: Import of natural gas in gaseous state—code 271178
Table 6: Import of natural gas in gaseous state—code 2711
Import
Code 2711

2005
(MM$)

2006
(MM$)

2007
(MM$)

2008
(MM$)

2009
(MM$)

2010
(MM$)

Turkmenistan

$96.58

$31.10

$0.00

$0.03

$0.15

$0.00

Kazakhstan
Russian
Federation
United Arab
Emirates

$64.38

$54.03

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$25.43

$360.60

$51.71

$0.01

$0.00

$0.00

$0.04

$0.16

$0.09

$0.09

$0.20

$0.38

United Kingdom

$0.03

$0.08

$0.15

$0.06

$0.01

$0.03

Turkey

$0.02

$0.00

$0.02

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

USA

$0.01

$0.01

$0.09

$0.01

$0.00

$0.00

$277.30

$465.38

$52.09

$0.20

$0.38

$0.42

67%

96%

100%

98%

96%

98%

World
These Countries
represent

In brief, this chapter portrays Azerbaijan as a producer and exporter of oil and
natural gas. The tables and figures presented show that the major Azeri energy partners
are European states, Turkey, Georgia, and Russia. The role of Western states in the Azeri
energy resources is significant due to the influence exerted by their investments in Azeri
energy. BP, for instance, controls the principal Azeri reserves of oil and natural gas as well
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as the pipeline networks that transport the oil and gas that is sold to international markets.
The information depicted in the tables and figures also shows that Azerbaijan changed its
status from an importer of energy resources to an exporter of energy resources between
2005 and 2007, when the construction of major international projects, such as pipelines,
refineries, and exploration platforms ended. The Azeri pipelines that run through Georgia,
Turkey, Iran, and Russia carry Azeri oil and natural gas to international markets. Therefore,
the Azeri government has to maintain a good relationship with all its major economic
investors, including the US, the UK, and Russia. Azerbaijan must also maintain a good
relationship with transit states, including Russia, Georgia, Turkey, and Iran, thus balancing
the power among regional and global powers in order to achieve stability and economic
prosperity.
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPETITION AMONG GLOBAL POWERS
Azerbaijan, as a landlocked country, needs economic and security partners to
strengthen its independence from Russia and to balance global powers’ influence in the
Caucasus. The global and regional powers compete for influence in the South Caucasus
region, organizing themselves into pro-Western and non-pro-Western states. The first
group is led by the US and includes the EU and Turkey, while the second group is headed by
Russia includes Iran and Armenia.79
The American presence in the South Caucasus attempts to gain influence by
decreasing Russian power in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new
independent states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia attempted to strengthen their
economic and military independence from Russia. The US became the principal Western
country supporting the South Caucasus states. The exploitation and commercialization of
Azeri energy resources in the early 1990’s became the most important reason for the
American immersion in the region. From the non-pro-Western side, Russia has been the
principal oil supplier for Europe, which has increased Moscow’s leverage over Western
states. The participation of Western states and oil companies in the trade of Azeri oil and
gas has represented a threat for Russia’s hegemonic position as a supplier of oil and gas to
Western markets.

79

Ismailov Papava, “A New Concept,” 283-98.
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Therefore, this chapter will analyze the global powers’ competition for influence
over Azerbaijan in isolation from geographic and energy factors that affect the Azeri
foreign policy in the interaction among Azerbaijan, the US, and Russia.

4.1 The Azerbaijan-Russia Relationship

4.1.1 Background
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia debated the meaning of the Russian
identity at local, regional, and global levels.80 Although Russian's elite knew Russian power
had decreased by the end of the 1990’s, Russian leaders realized that the former Soviet
Union was still important due to Russia’s location, energy resources, and military
capabilities. Thus, Russia has used bilateral and multilateral relations to preserve its
hegemonic power in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, where Russian power remains
largely unchallenged.
As Breslauer claims, Russian foreign policy has developed two cyclical phases
between the last years of the Cold War and the early years of the 21st Century. These
transitional phases are called transformation and consolidation. When Vladimir Putin took
power in Russia, the major challenge that Moscow faced was to rebuild its image as a
superpower, seeking to strengthen its territorial integrity and economic development.
Putin's administration sought to develop a responsible and predictable foreign

Robert Legvold, “Russia’s Unformed Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 80 (2001): 62. The problem with
identity is still a matter of discussion among experts in Russia who highlight the importance of how Russian
people and elites see and describe themselves in world affairs. George W. Breslauer, “Reflections on Patterns
of Leadership in Soviet and Post-Soviet [Russian] History,” Post-Soviet Affairs 26 (2010): 264.
80
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policy,81ensuring that Russia was no longer seen as a Western enemy but as an equal
partner.82 Russian leaders know that Russia’s status as a global power depended in part on
Moscow’s capability to deal with new local movements and secessionists groups in the
Caucasus region. The Chechnya and Georgia wars, in 1994 and 2008 respectively, were
examples of the new Russian reality, where territorial conflicts within Russia and along its
borders became a serious matter for Moscow because they affect the Russian status as a
superpower.
Under these circumstances, Vladimir Putin decided to restore Russian power and
authority in domestic and international affairs. Putin did not share Gorbachev's and
Yeltsin’s beliefs about Russian weakness. Gorbachev and Yeltsin shared a pessimistic
perspective about how Russia was perceived in the world, especially after the collapse of
the Soviet Union when Russia lost its status as a global power. This perspective depicted
the Soviet Union as an economically and politically weak state, asking for the West's
acceptance. 83 Putin believed that Moscow had to take advantage of its economic and
military resources. In the economic field, Moscow authorities, led by Putin, decided to
improve the commercialization and production of Russian oil and gas to export these
energy resources to Europe, seeking to increase Russian leverage over the European states,
especially since Russia was the major energy supplier for Europe. During Putin’s first
presidential term, the Russian economy had an average growth of seven percent due to the
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constant growth of the oil and gas prices and the liberal polices implemented by Putin. In
addition, Russia reinforced its process of political consolidation as a great power.
In the military field, Russia holds a significant variety and quantity of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD), which are rivaled only by the US. The Russian military capacity
and technology are recognized around the world, and Russian leaders have used other
states’ awareness of those weapons and technology to increase its leverage in world affairs.
Russian military and economic assets can easily persuade other states to avoid
confrontation with Russia. Moscow also announced to the former Soviet republics that
Russia would defend its regional and global interests using force if that is needed, as it did
during the Russia-Georgia War in 2008. This war proved that Russia was committed to
being recognized as a powerful leader in international affairs, and it showed that the
Western involvement in the South Caucasus was not strong enough to decrease Russian
leverage in the region.84 These aggressive actions were part of the pragmatic foreign policy
developed by Putin to reestablish Russia as a great power.
Within Russia’s global goals, its geographical location allows it to be in permanent
connection with the most influential regions, including Europe, the Middle East, Central
Asia, and the Asia-Pacific markets. 85 Russia’s location encouraged Moscow to create a
multi-vector86 and pragmatic policy to consolidate its status as a great power. Thus, Russia
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designed a complex and broad foreign policy to balance the US, the EU, and China 87 in a
global perspective, and the South Caucasus and Central Asia88 in a regional perspective. 89
The disagreements among regional and global powers have become a common issue in
recent decades, and for that reason Russian foreign policy cannot be a one-vector policy,
choosing only one region because there are several vectors (regions and states),90 that are
highly dynamic.
Regional policy became a crucial field for Russian foreign policy in order to achieve
international recognition and political, economic, and military stability. The Caucasus and
Central Asia obtained significance in a global perspective not only by their strategic
proximity to rogue states, such as Iran and Afghanistan, but also due to their natural
resources, which can be exported to Western markets. Another strategic region for Russian
interests is East Asia, especially China and India, where Moscow had dedicated significant
attention through diplomatic channels to strengthen the multi-vector foreign policy that
Putin’s government has pursued since he took power.
Russian economic improvement, its military capability, its direct involvement in
international organizations, its cultural and religious links with the former Soviet republics,
its energy interests, and its geographic location, are some of the major features that
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influence the design of the Russian foreign policy regarding the South Caucasus region.
Moscow manipulated those factors in its economic, political, and military interests during
the Soviet era, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is still seeking to keep that
leverage over the South Caucasus region. The geographical condition of Azerbaijan, as a
landlocked state, allows Russia to increase its power over Azeri oil and gas resources.
The following sections will discuss the geographic and energy factors that affect the
Russian-Azeri relationship and the need for a cooperative policy between Russia and
Azerbaijan in order to ensure an independent Azeri foreign policy.

4.1.2 Territorial factors in the Relationship between Russia and Azerbaijan
Russians and people of the Caucasus have lived together for centuries, and that
created a constant social, economic, political, and cultural interaction among the different
ethnic groups who inhabit the Caucasus region. This constant communication has created
the conditions for collaboration based on singular interests. The first years after the
Caucasus states gained their independence from Russia in the early 1990's were crucial to
establish open bilateral and multilateral ties with Russia. By June 1996, Russian leaders
and the main leaders of the Caucasus region signed the “Declaration for International
Concord, Peace, and Economic and Cultural Cooperation in the Caucasus” in Kislovodsk,
Russia. This declaration of cooperation in a federative fashion was the most significant
attempt to keep Caucasus states as a unique community of nations. 91
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Since Russia considered the South Caucasus as part of its sphere of influence,
Moscow sought to consolidate the political and military stability of the region by
strengthening ties with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Russian-Caucasus relationships
did not improve significantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union except for in the case of
Armenia. Azerbaijan and Georgia sought to strength their economic, political, and military
independence from Russia by developing a pro-Western foreign policy, which increased
Russian concerns about the EU and NATO expansion into the Russian sphere of influence.
Once Russia realized that Western states were establishing security ties with Georgia and
Azerbaijan, Moscow decided to intensify its political ties with former Soviet republics
through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), seeking to decrease Western
military presence in the South Caucasus region. 92
During Imperial and Soviet times, the South Caucasus was a buffer zone that
protected Russia from the outside world, and the collapse of the Soviet Union did not
change this characteristic. Russia increased its concerns when Azerbaijan designed oil and
gas pipelines that would take Azeri energy resources to Western markets without passing
through Russian territory. This Azeri measure would decrease the Russian hegemonic
position as an oil supplier for Europe, and it also increased the Azeri economic and political
independence from Russia, especially since the BTC pipeline had economic and political
support from Western states, led by the US. 93
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In the case of the Russian-Azeri relationships, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict played
a crucial role in how both countries built their political and military ties. The AzeriArmenian conflict goes back to 1921 when Soviet authorities rejected the Armenian claim
over the unification of the Nagorno-Karabakh region with Armenia. The Soviet government
decided to keep that region within Azerbaijan, but that decision did not persuade
Armenians to give up in their interest in annexing the Nagorno-Karabakh region to the
main Armenian territory. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh claimed
its independence from Azerbaijan and Armenia recognized it, creating a subsequent
military confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. By February 1992, Armenian
troops had taken over Khojaly territory, an Azeri enclave in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan
claimed that Armenian forces massacred more than 1,000 civilians during this military
occupation, which had the Russian army’s support. 94 The Russian approach to this conflict
intensified the Azeri confrontation with Moscow, and it also divided the regional powers in
the South Caucasus. Turkey directly supported Azerbaijan, closing its borders and imposing
economic sanctions against Armenia. Iran, on the other hand, took diplomatic measures to
mediate in the Azeri-Armenian conflict. Russia, in the meantime, dissolved the military
regiment that it had in the battlefield and ordered its troops to withdraw from the
Nagorno-Karabakh region.
During mid-May 1992, Armenia already controlled the whole region of NagornoKarabakh, and by 1993, the Armenian army took almost the twenty percent of Azerbaijan’s
territory, including the cities of Kebajar, Agdam, Fizuli, Jabrayil, Gubadly, and Zangilan.
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International organizations began working on resolving the conflict in 1993. The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)95 demanded an immediate
ceasefire and the Armenian withdrawal from Azeri territory. The Azeri and Armenian
claims regarding Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have two different roots. While the Azeri
government claims territorial integrity, Armenian authorities ask for the conservation of
their historical heritage.
By the end of 1999, Russia encouraged Azerbaijan and Armenia to begin with
bilateral negotiations under the framework of the Minsk Group (MG) in order to work
together to solve the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2000, Russia, in its role as
co-chair of MG, proposed the creation of a special commission of experts to evaluate the
conditions for the inhabitants of the Nagorno-Karabakh, proposing the creation of a peace
mission. Russia worked directly with Robert Kocharian and Heidar Aliyev, the presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively, showing Moscow’s interest in strengthening political
ties with its new independent neighbors. In mid-August 2000, Korichan and Aliyev met in
Yalta under Russia’s mediation, and both presidents confirmed their intentions to continue
the dialogue to solve the territorial confrontation. 96 As of June 2012, Armenia and
Azerbaijan are still in negotiations for the final resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.
The geographic location of Russia provides Moscow with significant power to
influence Azerbaijan, which is a landlocked territory with significant energy resources to
export to international markets. However, the Azeri geographical location limits its
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possibilities to become a major oil and gas exporter, and for that reason Azerbaijan has had
to strengthen its ties with Russia, since Moscow had developed an integrated pipeline
system to transport Caspian oil and gas to international markets. The construction of the
pipeline shows the Russian commitment to extend its influence over Azerbaijan and the
South Caucasus through cooperative policies and soft power, or by coercive means and
hard power. The Russia-Georgia War in 2008 was an example for the latter.

4.1.3 Energy factors in the Relationship between Russia and Azerbaijan
The Russian-Azeri relationship in regard to oil began in 1920 when Bolsheviks
captured Baku, but it acquired geopolitical significance during the Second World War when
Nazi Germany designed a military offensive against the South Caucasus, seeking to take the
Baku oilfields, which represented 90 percent of Soviet fuel as of March 1942.97
Russia and Azerbaijan maintained bilateral relations after the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991. Those relations, however, based on military, economic, political, and
cultural cooperation did not reach a significant level due to the preexisting mistrust
between both countries. Some scholars explain that the strategic partnership between
Russia and Armenia,98 the latter considered the principal enemy of Azerbaijan, increased
the Azeri mistrust of Russia, especially after Armenia seized the Azeri region of NagornoKarabakh in 1992. It meant that Russia attempted to renew its influence over the South
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Caucasus region, taking advantages of the territorial and ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.
Russian foreign policy in the South Caucasus attempted to prevent the growth of
Western influence in the region, centralizing the transportation of Azeri oil and gas through
Russian territory.99 However, after Western states and oil companies began working with
Azeri and Georgian authorities, Russian leaders changed their approach to Azerbaijan and
Georgia, seeking to increase Moscow’s participation in the exploitation and
commercialization of the Azeri energy resources.
To meet these goals, Russia developed a multilateral and bilateral policy where
supranational organizations, such as CIS, led by Moscow, played a key role in regional
affairs between the former Soviet republics and Russia. This multi-vector policy, however,
did not succeed in strengthening Russian-Azeri relations because Baku developed a
pragmatic foreign policy balancing Western powers against Russia. Azerbaijan was able to
reduce the Russian leverage due its oil and gas, but that was not the case for Armenia,
which has substantially depended on Russia due to Armenian's lack of energy resources.
Russian support of Armenia during Nagorno-Karabakh conflict increased the
tension between Russia and Azerbaijan. The Azeri government realized that its economic,
political, and military independence from Russia relied on its energy resources, and for that
reason it had to develop economic and security ties with Western powers. The BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipelines built by Azeri and Western
oil companies sought to avoid Russian territory, creating a route that runs from Azerbaijan
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to Georgia, Georgia to Turkey, and then from Turkey to Western markets. Once the pipeline
started working at full capacity, the Azeri government received more than US$20 billion in
revenues. From 2006 to 2008, Azeri revenues increased by almost a third every year.100
The current Azeri oil fields under exploitation are Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli (ACG),
with estimated reserves estimated at five billion barrels of oil. By 1994, the Azeri president
Heidar Aliyev and nine international oil companies101 signed the “Contract of the Century.”
The companies involved in this contract came from six different countries including Russia
and Turkey.102 Azeri authorities sought to use this contract to please global and regional
powers without creating a chaotic relationship among all of them. Because the economics,
politics, and national defense of Azerbaijan were under Russian influence after the collapse
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of the Soviet Union, Heidar Aliyev had to negotiate carefully with Moscow, Washington, and
Tehran in order to balance their interests over Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus region.
Thus, Heidar Aliyev as an expert negotiator knew that Azeri independence would
depend on bringing Russia and the Western powers to the South Caucasus region. The best
way to achieve that goal was by creating an economic consortium where Western and nonWestern oil companies joined the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) in the
exploitation and commercialization of Azeri energy resources. Thus, SOCAR and the
principal oil companies from Great Britain, the US, Russia, Norway, and Turkey created the
consortium Azerbaijan International Operation Company (AIOC). 103 The exclusion of Iran
from this consortium created significant resentment among Iranian authorities because
Baku and Tehran had signed an agreement before the establishment of the AIOC about
Iranian participation in the new consortium, but American objections to the Iranian
participation in the Contract of the Century forced Azerbaijan to remove Iran. President
Aliyev understood the importance of the American and Iranian confrontational interests in
the South Caucasus, and he used the Azeri-Iranian relationship to obtain some economic
and political concessions from the US. This strategy also allowed Azerbaijan to gain some
concessions from Iran, especially when Baku allowed American troops to stay near the
Azeri-Iranian border, increasing the uncertainty about a possible American attack on Iran
from Azeri soil.104
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For the transportation of Azeri oil and gas, the Iranian and Russian infrastructures
represented viable outlets for the Azeri energy resources before Azerbaijan opted for the
construction of the BTC and BTE. Iran proposed an oil swap to Azerbaijan. Since the quality
of the Iranian oil is similar to the Azeri oil, Tehran offered to transport the Azeri oil from
the southern regions of Azerbaijan to the northern provinces of Iran in order to satisfy the
demands of Iranian consumption of oil, and in exchange Iran offered to export its own oil to
international markets in favor of Azerbaijan.105 However, this offer did not satisfy US
interests, and Azerbaijan had to refuse it. Another proposal was the Russian offer, which
offered to transport Azeri oil through Russian pipelines from Baku to the Russian Black Sea
port of Novorossiysk. Yet, Baku dismissed this option initially because it would increase
Russian leverage over Azerbaijan by centralizing the commercialization of the Azeri oil, and
Baku and Western authorities were focused on decreasing Moscow’s energy monopoly in
order to increase Azerbaijan’s economic and political independence.
Under these circumstances, a multiple-pipelines policy was implemented to ensure
Azeri oil trade independence. Azerbaijan agreed to negotiate with Georgia the construction
of an oil pipeline that runs from Baku to the Georgian port of Supsa in the Black Sea. By
1998, the oil pipeline of Supsa began working, and it became the initial solution for the
export of Azeri oil to international markets while avoiding Russian territory.106
In 1998, following the policy of diversifying oil outlets, the Azeri government
evaluated the Turkish offer of building a new pipeline that runs from Baku to Tbilisi and
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then from Tbilisi to Ceyhan (BTC), reaching the Mediterranean sea in southern Turkey.
This project presented significant political and environmental benefits. The oil transported
to the Black Sea and then to the Mediterranean Sea had ecological risks, especially since the
ships that carry the Azeri oil increased the transit over the Bosporus Strait and the risk of
possible ship accidents in the Black Sea that could cause significant ecologic damage. On the
other hand, the construction of the BTC, politically speaking, avoids the Russian territory,
diminishing the Russian predominant position as an oil supplier for Europe and increasing
the Azeri economic and political independence from Russia. However, the Azeri foreign
policy based on multiple pipeline routes created fears of a military intervention in the
aftermath of the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, when Russia invade Georgia. This military
conflict in August 2008 created concern among the members of the AIOC consortium, when
Georgia’s government and BP authorities decided to shut down the BTC pipeline as a
preventive measure, fearing a possible Russian attack on the pipeline.
Regardless the recent Russia-Georgia War in 2008, Russia has attempted to
strengthen its economic and political ties with Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus, especially
since Vladimir Putin became a president of Russia. The Russia-Georgia war in 2008
represented a polemical approach made by Russia to the South Caucasus region. The
Russian government reformulated its foreign policy regarding the Caucasus states since
Vladimir Putin took power, seeking to strengthen the common interests that Russia shares
with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. This multi-vector policy developed under the Putin
presidency did not find a great partner in Azerbaijan, especially after Russia threatened to
attack the BTC oil pipeline.
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Azerbaijan and its economic partners in the exploitation and commercialization of
Azeri oil distrusted Russian intentions in the South Caucasus. Armenia, on the other hand,
took advantage of the Russian-Azeri mistrust. Armenian authorities strengthened
economic ties with Russia and Iran through energy agreements. The Russian government
sponsored the construction of a gas pipeline that runs from Iran to Armenia, ensuring
energy for Armenia. The strong Russia-Armenia relationship has concerned Azeri
authorities since Russia supported Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and it
increased the Azeri skepticism about the Russian intentions in the South Caucasus.
The Azerbaijan-US relationship has affected the Russian interests in the Caucasus
region and it promoted Russian hostility against Azerbaijan. The Russian-Azeri relationship
improved when the Azeri government stated that Azerbaijan would not pursue
membership in NATO as Georgia did. This measure showed the Azeri foreign policy’s
pragmatism and flexibility in dealing with its neighbor states to ensure its survival.
Therefore, the Azeri leaders proved to have the ability to design and re-design the
Azeri policy based on new circumstances and needs. Azerbaijan has been able to balance
global powers through diversified export of its energy resources and its geographical
location. The multi-vector policy designed by Azerbaijan has allowed it to develop a
cooperative policy with the global powers and its neighbor states, increasing political,
economic, and military stability. Azerbaijan has developed a more pragmatic foreign policy
than Georgia in the sense that Azeri authorities created a policy that avoids confrontations
with global power and neighbor states.
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4.2 The Azerbaijan-US Relationship
4.2.1 Background
The significant growth of worldwide energy consumption raises question about
control over energy resources. The international competition to obtain energy resources
has become one of the major issues driving international relations. Under these
circumstances, it seems that political and military intervention in countries that hold
energy resources would become a widespread practice. The biggest military power on the
earth, the US, seeks to ensure energy supplies for the coming decades due its increasing
energy demand. This increasing demand will increase the American energy dependence on
foreign oil and gas suppliers. This energy dependence has also significantly affected the
Western European states and the new economic powers, China and India, which are also
trying to diversify their energy suppliers in order to ensure their industrial and economic
development.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Western powers, led by the US, attempted
to get involved in the South Caucasus and Central Asia regions. The Western states initially
promoted free markets, democracy, and rule of law in those regions. This approach
changed when Western states and oil companies realized the revenues and power that they
would gain by exploiting and trading Azeri oil and gas to international markets. The Azeri
oil and gas became one the most critical issues for US foreign policy when Western oil
companies and the Azeri government signed the “Contract of the Century” in 1996 to
exploit the Chirag-Guneshli oil field. This contract strengthened the commercial
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relationship between Azerbaijan and the US, allowing American oil and industrial
companies to develop different energy projects related to the energy industry, such as the
construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) oil and gas
pipelines, which bypass Russia. The Contract created the possibility that Azerbaijan could
become an alternative oil and gas supplier for Western markets.
The terrorist attacks in Washington D.C. and New York on September 11, 2001,
shifted American foreign policy in different aspects. Washington changed its approach to
the South Caucasus, seeking to increase its influence in that region. The American strategy
included increasing influence over the Azeri energy resources,107 reducing Russian
leverage in the South Caucasus, decreasing Iranian influence in the region, balancing power
among South Caucasus states, ensuring European diversification of energy suppliers,
strengthening the role of international organizations in the region, and ensuring the spread
of free markets, democracy, and rule of law.
The achievement of these goals depended on how the US redesigned its foreign
policy, taking into account Azerbaijan’s landlocked geography and its energy resources.
Washington realized that the Azeri government was aware of its geopolitical importance
and had already taken advantage of that position, developing a pragmatic foreign policy
balancing the US, Russia, and Iran.108
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4.2.2 Energy Factors in the Relationship between Azerbaijan and the US
In the early 1990’s, the US established diplomatic relationships with the new
independent states of the South Caucasus region after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At
the beginning, Washington did not have a definite policy regarding these states, so the US
government developed bilateral relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia
independently. Washington had some difficulties delineating a coherent foreign policy with
these states because the US was more focused on Russia than in the new independent
states that emerged from the Soviet Union. The US, like the rest of the international
community, was not ready to deal with a new reduced power, Russia, and with fifteen new
unstable states. The American approach to the Caucasus states became more complicated
due to the Americans’ lack of information about the geography, history, politics, and culture
of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. Thus, when the US decided to deal with Azerbaijan
and the other two South Caucasus states, it struggled to determine the best strategy for
advancing US interests because American authorities did not have a strong understanding
of the role and influence of each of those states in the region.109
During the Clinton administration, Washington pursued political, economic, and
military stability in the South Caucasus region by spreading democracy, free markets, and
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liberal values. Those measures attempt to ensure the flow of the Caspian oil and gas to
international markets (excluding Iran from the energy business), decrease Russia’s
dominant position as a military power and energy supplier110 to the Western markets,111
help Western European states to diversify their oil and gas suppliers, and increase
American leverage in the South Caucasus region.
The American economic/energy approach to Azerbaijan began in the early 1990’s
when the principal American oil companies signed the first contract with the Azeri
government to exploit and export Azeri energy resources. The geopolitical importance of
Azerbaijan to US interests persuaded Washington to begin a broader involvement in the
South Caucasus region. The political, economic, and military roles of Russia, Iran, and
Turkey in the South Caucasus region became the main concern for Washington, and the US
had to adapt its foreign policy to contain Russia and Iran by supporting Turkey in the early
1990’s.112
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought a new perspective on how the
Americans approached the South Caucasus region. When president George W. Bush began
the War on Terror, the American government sought different access points to Central Asia
to deal with the terrorist groups hosted in Afghanistan. The first American military
deployments began at the end of September 2001 when NATO and the US established
military air bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and when they positioned military forces
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in Tajikistan.113 Moscow leaders expressed their support for the American War on Terror
and for the American military campaigns against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in
Afghanistan. The Russian support of Washington included military assistance, intelligence
support, military equipment, and military advice in Central Asia.114
Once the US government discovered the potential for Azeri energy resources to
increase its influence over world markets, the US sought to diversify its energy suppliers.
Washington realized that in the coming decades, Asian countries, especially China and
India, would increase their energy demand due to their constant economic and industrial
growth, and that growing demand would create a complex competition for energy
resources.
Because the price of oil and gas responds to fluctuations between supply and
demand, that price has been unstable, and that instability is likely to intensify in the coming
years due to the increasing demand for energy resources in Asia and the potential military
confrontations in the Middle East. 115 Oil and gas as global products respond to the market's
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114 The reasons behind the Russian diplomatic and military support of the U.S after the terrorist attacks in
Washington and New York in 2001 have created controversy due to the instrumental reasons in which
Moscow based its foreign policy in the early 2000s. Thorun, Explaining Change, 111-19. On the other hand,
Svante Cornell suggests that Russia provided limited airspace access to the US during the American incursion
in Central Asia. Svante E. Cornell, The Politicization of Islam in Azerbaijan, (Washington: The Central AsiaCaucasus Institute, 2006): 30-31.
115 On February 19, 2012, The Iranian government decided to stop exporting oil to Britain and France in
response to the European Union’s decision to cut off Iranian oil imports beginning in July 2012. Tehran took
this measure after the European Union expressed its concerns over Iran’s nuclear program. This political
measured affected the price of oil, which has risen to its highest level since May 2011.
Steven Erlanger, “Iran Halts Oil Exports to Britain and France,” The New York Times, February 19, 2012,
accessed February 21, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/world/middleeast/iran-halts-oil-shipments-to-britain-andfrance.html?scp=3&sq=STEVEN%20ERLANGER&st=Search. “Oil Price Highest for Nine Months,” BBC
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rules instead of political tendencies. During the Clinton presidency, the US developed a
cohesive policy to spread democracy, free markets, and rule of law in the former Soviet
republics, which became new independent states. This policy based on political and
economic cooperation116 also sought to mitigate regional military conflicts, seeking to
integrate the new independent states with the international community, where they can
embrace liberal-democratic values. 117
These liberal initiatives, however, did not benefit Azerbaijan at the beginning,
especially after the American Congress issued the Freedom Support Act in 1992.118 The
American Congress included the Section 907 in the Act, and it stated that Azerbaijan would
not receive any assistance from the US until the Azeri government demonstrates that it is
working to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and the
Nagorno-Karabakh region.119 The inconsistency of Section 907 appeared when the
Security Council of the United Nations issued a resolution condemning the Armenian
occupation of the Azeri territories. 120

Business, February 21, 2012, accessed on February 21, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business17119823.
116 The US government provides economic support to new independent states through the Freedom Support
Act, which excluded Azerbaijan through Section 907 of the Act because the US supported Armenians fighting
for independence in Nagorno-Karabakh at the beginning of the conflict.
117 Menzel, Doomed to Cooperate?, 72.
118 Democratic Senator John Kerry introduced that bill, and it was supported by the Armenian lobby, which
has significant influence over the American Congress in comparison to the Azeri lobby. Cornell, "The
Politicization of Islam," 30-31. Pinar Ipek, "Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy and Challenges for Energy Security,"
Middle East Journal 63 (2009): 232.
119 Due to the reduced military power of the Azeri army at the end of the Soviet Union, it is difficult to prove
that Azerbaijan had the capability and capacity to impose a blockade on Armenia because Azerbaijan was not
able to prevent Armenia from trading with other countries. Cornell, Azerbaijan since Independence, 406.
120 Husein Baghirov, the Azeri Minister of Trade, claimed that even though Azeri people want to be part of
Western society and democratic society, they find themselves disappointed with the American government
because Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act represents an unfair political and economic punishment to
Azeri citizens, who in this case are victims of the small but powerful Armenian lobby in the U.S.
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Clinton was aware of the negative consequences of Section 907 for the American
national and global interests, and he advocated its repeal to protect American interests in
the South Caucasus region. However, he did not gain enough support in the Congress to
revoke it during his presidential term. After the terrorist attacks in Washington D.C. and
New York in September 2011, president George W. Bush revoked the Section 907 of the
Freedom Support Act, improving the economic, political, and military relationship between
the US and Azerbaijan.
The US and Azerbaijan based their economic relationship on the exploitation and
export of Azeri oil and gas to international markets. Once the Western oil companies began
negotiations with Azeri authorities about the energy resources of Azerbaijan, Washington
designed a specific foreign policy focused on advancing the Western influence in the trade
of Azeri oil and gas. The American incursion into the energy business in Azerbaijan
included the design and construction of new pipeline routes, which would bypass the
Russian territory in order to decrease the Russian leverage over Azeri energy. The major
American pipeline project was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline,121 which became the
second longest pipeline in the world at a length of 1,110 miles and with an investment of $4
billion.122 The complexity of the development of this pipeline project did not only lie in the
cost of its construction but in the consensus that Azerbaijan had to achieve with Georgia

Husein Baghirov, “Who Governs America?” Azerbaijan International, Winter 2000, accessed February 9, 2012,
http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/84_folder/84_articles/84_quotes_baghirov.html.
121 This pipeline was a response to the Russian offer to transport Azeri oil from Baku to Grozny and
Tikhoretsk in Russia, and then from Grozny and Tikhoretsk to the Russian port of Novorossiysk in the Black
Sea. The Russian offer was refused due to the military conflicts that Russia was facing in the Northern
Caucasian regions of Chechnya and Grozny. Amy Jaffe, "US Policy Towards the Caspian Region: Can the WishList Be Realized?"in The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, ed. Gennady Chufrin (New York: SIPRI - Oxford
University Press, 2001), 142.
122 De Waal, The Caucasus, 170-71.
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and Turkey to build the pipeline that would run through those two transit states,
generating a revenue of around $20 billion for Azerbaijan. The BTC pipeline attempted to
put Azerbaijan on the world energy map and create one of the fastest growing economies
in the world.
The economic relations between Washington and Baku included the participation of
both Ankara and Tbilisi for the development of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which
takes oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and Western markets. This
pipeline put Azerbaijan on the world energy map and within the international economic
system.
In the political field, the construction of the BTC, on one hand, benefited Azerbaijan
by increasing its political and economic autonomy from Russia, improving Azeri
relationships with Western states, strengthening the Azeri position in the South Caucasus
relative to Georgia and Armenia, ensuring Azeri economic growth, and balancing the
regional and global powers in the South Caucasus to Azerbaijan’s benefit. On the other
hand, the political benefits for America included decreasing the Russian hegemonic
position as an energy supplier; increasing American involvement in the economy, politics,
military of the South Caucasus region; diversifying Western energy suppliers; decreasing
Iranian influence in the energy resources of the South Caucasus region; and increasing
Turkey’s influence in the region.
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4.2.3 Military Factors in the Relationship between Azerbaijan and the US
The first American approach to Azerbaijan was vague in the sense that Washington
did not develop a clear foreign policy toward the South Caucasus region in the early 1990’s.
The collapse of the Soviet Union generated new independent states, which attempted to
consolidate their independence from Russia, seeking new allies and investors to balance
the predominant Russian influence in the region. By 1993 and 1994, the Azeri and Kazakh
governments and the principal US oil companies began signing the first oil contracts,
opening the South Caucasus and Caspian Sea energy resources to American interests.123
The US used liberal measures to approach Azerbaijan in two different ways. The
first American approach was unilateral, seeking bilateral compromises in energy and
military aspects, while the second approach was multilateral through international
organizations, such as the UN, the OSCE,124 and NATO. In both approaches, the US
government used economic and military means to increase its influence over Azerbaijan,
mediating in military conflicts in Georgia (Abkhazia, Ajdaria, and South Ossetia) as well as
Azerbaijan and Armenia (Nagorno-Karabakh). The American involvement sought to

There is some suspicion about how the US developed its bilateral relationships with the new independent
states of the South Caucasus and Caspian Sea regions. Fiona Hill claims that the American recognition of the
independence of Armenia in January 1992 and the establishment of diplomatic ties with Azerbaijan in
February 1992 represented some kind of hierarchy of states in the U.S policy. She believes that the Freedom
Support Act, approved by the American Congress in 1992, did not benefit Azerbaijan in the same fashion as it
did for Armenia due to Section 907. However, Hill points out that the members of Congress were the ones
who decided to put Azerbaijan in a different category, rather than the U.S executive branch. Hill "Not-SoGrand-Strategy,” 95-108.
124 The OSCE, led by European states and supported by the American government, is the world’s largest
security-oriented intergovernmental organization focused on arms control, human rights, freedom of the
press, fair elections, and solving regional conflicts.
123
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internationalize125 those conflicts by engaging the international community for the benefit
of the South Caucasus states and Western powers.
The American military presence in the South Caucasus region increased after the
deployment of American troops in the region during mid-1990’s. The international
community’s participation in the resolution of the Azeri-Armenian conflicts hid the US
involvement in the region. The American participation in the Caucasus conflicts through
international organizations allowed Washington to avoid confrontation with Russia in any
conflict-resolution process in the South Caucasus region. Since international organizations
are working together with the Azeri, Armenian, Georgian, American, and Russian
authorities to solve the military conflicts in the region, any military confrontation between
the US and Russia would mean a direct confrontation against the international
organizations, and that would likely affect the Russian image in the international
community. 126
The Azeri government supported the US military campaign against Al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan providing access to its airspace, since transit over Iranian air space was
unthinkable, and transit over Russian airspace was limited. The US-Azeri relationship
reached a new level when the American Congress waived Section 907of the Freedom
Support Act and encouraged Baku to support American military intervention in Iraq by
sending Azeri troops.127 Washington, for its part, increased its participation in Azeri energy

Jaffe, "US Policy Towards the Caspian Region
Bagirov, "Azerbaijan's Strategy Choice,” 178-94. Rondeli, "The Choice of Independent Georgia," 195-211.
127 Cornell, Azerbaijan since Independence, 410. The Azeri population did not see a radical change in the way
they see and describe American actions in the South Caucasus, especially in regard to Armenia. When the
American Congress waived Section 907, the Azeri realized that they did not obtain more independence from a
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projects, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which increased the Azeri economic,
political, and military independence and influence in the region.
The geographical distance between the US and the South Caucasus states reduces
the risk of any military attack against the US, and it has provided Washington some
distance to analyze and adapt its foreign policy to the current reality of the South Caucasus
and Caspian Sea regions. Evaluating the American-Azeri relationship also requires
attention to the American intention of monitoring Russian and Iranian policies regarding
Azerbaijan’s energy resources.
The current American grand strategy depends on basic goals, which go along with
the selective engagement strategy.128 This strategy relies on Washington's defense of US
national interests through effective use of its military power. This military power has
served the national interests successfully, not only defending the American territory but
also its political, economic, and military interests all over the world. Thus, the notion that
military force no longer serves American interests is false.129 Although the international
order seems to become more interdependent with the spread of democracy, free markets,
human rights, and the rule of law, it does not mean that states should not have efficient
military forces, especially in a world where there is no global government institution with a
significant military power to enforce its decisions.

foreign state but became dependent on a new kind of influence, the American one. Cornell, "The Politicization
of Islam,” 30-31.
128 Robert J. Art, America's Grand Strategy and World Politics (New York: Routledge, 2009), 234.
129 Art, America's Grand Strategy, 7.
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The American primary interests130 are (1) preventing an attack on the American
homeland; (2) preventing war and security competition among the Eurasian great powers;
(3) maintaining secure oil supplies in oil-rich Gulf states and the Caspian Sea; and (4)
supporting the spread of democracy, free markets, rule of law, global institutions, and
liberal values. To achieve all of these goals, Washington has been applying realist and
liberal measures. For instance, the American attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq represent a
realist response to the military threats that Washington faced on September 2001,
especially due to the circumstances in which Washington decided to wage those wars
avoiding the UN Security Council’s decision. The liberal aspect of the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq lies in the arguments elaborated by Washington officials stating the importance of
spreading democracy, human rights, free markets, and rule of law in Central Asia and the
Middle East.
Within the primary American interests, Eurasia is one of the most important regions
for the US foreign policy. A war between two superpowers is not impossible in Eurasia, but
it is unlikely to happen. A war between South Caucasus states is likely to occur, as it did
when Armenia invaded Azerbaijan in 1990, where global and regional powers, such as the

Robert J. Art depicts the American’s national interests listing them in three major categories: vital (defense
of the homeland), highly important (deep peace among great powers and secure access to Persian Gulf oil at
stable and reasonable prices), and important (international economic openness, consolidation of democracy
and spread and observance of human rights, and no severe climate change). However, his ranking has
changed and instead of three categories, now there are only two categories: vital interests (homeland
security, Eurasian great power peace, division of Gulf reserves) and desirable interests (international
economic openness, the spreading of democracy, human rights protection, and global environmental
protection). This shift in the ranking of the American’s national interests strengthens the position of energy
resources and the regions that hold those resources. Thus, the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea regions as
a whole have acquired more significance than before for American foreign policy. Robert J. Art, A Grand
Strategy for America, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 45-81, and Art, America's Grand Strategy, 234250.
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US, the EU, Russia, and China, could increase the already exiting political and military
instability in the region. For instance, during the Nagorno-Karabakh War, Russia militarily
supported Armenia against Azerbaijan,131 showing its interests in regaining its status as a
global and regional power, keeping its territorial integrity, and increasing its influence in
the Caspian Sea energy markets. 132
The American political, economic, and military support for Azerbaijan and Georgia,
on the other hand, has not reached the level that can compromise the American
involvement in any possible military confrontation against Russia. For instance, the RussiaGeorgia War of August 2008 did not involve the US or Western European military
participation, leaving Georgia alone. Even, the official statement made by the Georgian
president Shevardnadze in 2002 about his country’s intention of seeking full NATO
membership did not receive Western support during the war. Indeed, even the US’s official
endorsement of the admission of Georgia as new NATO member in 2007, through the
Freedom Consolidation Act,133 did not persuade Washington to get involved in the RussiaGeorgia War.
After the Azeri-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the US government
provided military training and weapons to Azerbaijan through NATO. The Partnership for
Peace (PfP) program, one of the main NATO programs in the South Caucasus region, sought

Piner Ipek, "Azerbaijn's Foreign Policy and Challenges for Energy Security," Middle East Journal 63, (2009):
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to improve Azeri military capabilities, training Azeri officials for NATO peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations.134 Since political and military instability were the rule in the
South Caucasus region, the PfP program attempted to bring security and stability to the
region, encouraging prosperity and democratization through economic development.135
The PfP program encouraged Azerbaijan and Georgia to strengthen ties with
Western states, pursuing a significant partnership with NATO and increasing the Azeri and
Georgian expectation of becoming a NATO member, which would ensure their political,
economic, and military independence from Russia. Another program led by the US
government was the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which
sought to prevent illicit transfer of nuclear materials through the Caspian region. The Azeri
commitment to work together with NATO in the South Caucasus made possible that 250
NATO servicemen arrived in Azerbaijan in August 2000 to protect the southern Azeri
border, due to the possible Iranian military attack after Tehran planned to deploy more
than 6,000 soldiers, 75 tanks and vehicles, and fighter aircraft to the Azeri-Iranian
border.136
In brief, Washington has sponsored different military and economic programs in the
South Caucasus and Caspian Sea regions, and Azerbaijan has represented one of the key
strategic states for American economic and military interests. This was reflected in
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright statement to the US Congress that US foreign policy
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should focus on strategic locations that are energy-rich,137 seeking to diversify American
energy suppliers that rely on trade routes through the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf
and the Bosporus Strait in Turkey.138 By developing economic, political, and military ties
with Azerbaijan, Washington not only reduced the Russian hegemonic position in the
energy trade, but also contained Iranian influence in the Caspian Sea's energy resources.
Azeri geography and energy resources became crucial factors for American foreign
policy in the South Caucasus and Eurasia. Azerbaijan has used its economic partnership
with the US to balance Russia, and this balance allowed Azerbaijan to gain economic
stability, ensuring the transportation of Azeri energy resources to international markets
while bypassing Russian territory. This American-Azeri economic partnership has gone
along with a military partnership that attempted to strength the Azeri military forces
through military trainings and the sale of weapons. The military links between Azerbaijan
and the US showed the increasing American influence and role in Azerbaijan and in the
South Caucasus. Therefore, the US and Azerbaijan’s economic and military relationship
affects the American approach to the Caucasus region, and that also influences the Azeri
foreign policy due to the Russian factor.

Robin Bhatty and Rachel Bronson, “NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” Survival 42,
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
This research has evaluated how Azerbaijan’s landlocked geography, its energy
resources, and the global powers’ competition for influence affect the independence of
Azeri foreign policy. Azerbaijan’s landlocked position connecting Europe and Asia sets
physical limitations on its ability to export its energy resources to the Western markets.
Azerbaijan has attempted to enhance its economic, political, and military
independence from Russia, developing a multi-vector foreign policy to balance global
powers in the South Caucasus region through cooperative economic and military measures.
Among these cooperative military measures are the Azeri-Russian agreements over the
Russian radar station in Gabala and the Azeri-US cooperation through the Partnership for
Peace program developed by NATO. These agreements have ensured military stability
between Azerbaijan and its neighbor states.
Another feature of the Azeri landlocked state is the influence that transit states have
over the Azeri energy trade. Since Azerbaijan lacks an outlet to the sea, its energy resources
have to transit over Russia, Georgia, Iran, and Turkey to reach international markets. These
transit states could constrict Azeri foreign policy due their geographical locations and
access to international seas. The Azeri government implemented a sophisticated energy
relationship with Georgia, Turkey, and Russia to reinforce its multi-vector policy, ensuring
diverse routes to export Azeri oil and gas to international markets, thus reducing the
influence of any single regional partner or global power.
Azeri oil and gas play a key role in Azerbaijan’s economic development. After the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Baku sought to consolidate its independence from Russia by
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exporting its energy resources to Western markets. Azeri oil and gas became a tool to
increase Azerbaijan’s leverage in the energy market. The Western states were part of the
Azeri plan for bringing together global and regional powers to balance Russia and Iran,
creating four major outcomes that encouraged the political, economic, and military
involvement of Western powers: 1) allowing Western states to diversify their energy
suppliers, 2) increasing the American influence over European and South Caucasus states,
3) compelling Russia to redesign its energy policy with Azerbaijan, and 4) increasing
Iranian interests in the commercialization of Azeri energy resources.
Economic agreements based on energy have strengthened the Azeri relationship
with its neighbor states and global powers. Georgia and Armenia, in a regional perspective,
have seen in Azeri natural resources an opportunity to improve their fragile economies.
These states, as is the case for many other former Soviet republics, depended on Russia as
an energy supplier for decades, and the collapse of the Soviet Empire created different
opportunities and challenges for those new independent states. In the cases of Georgia and
Armenia, the Azeri energy resources represented an opportunity to gain economic benefit
for the transit fee that Azerbaijan would pay for transporting its oil and gas through these
countries to international markets, so both states sought to consolidate their economic ties
with Azerbaijan. The military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan eliminated the
Armenian chances to become a transit state for the Azeri energy resources. This conflict
benefited Georgia, which became the official transit state for the Azeri oil and gas that run
from Azerbaijan to Georgia, then from Georgia to Turkey, and finally from Turkey to

83

Western markets. Thus, Georgia and Turkey became the pro-Western transit states for
Azeri energy resources.
Global powers, on the other hand, have attempted to diversify their energy suppliers
to meet their economic goals. The Western European states' energy dependency on
Russian and Middle Eastern energy is a clear example of the significance of the Azeri oil and
gas for Western markets. By strengthening energy ties with Western states, Azerbaijan
obtains assistance with economic matters (free markets, international financial aid),
politics (democratization, human rights, conflict resolution assistance regarding the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and rule of law), and security (military training, military
equipment, and weapons), strengthening Azerbaijan’s independence from Russia.
Azerbaijan’s role as a producer and exporter of oil and natural gas delineated the
global and regional importance of Azerbaijan for international politics. The power that
Western states (especially the US), Turkey, Georgia, and Russia have over Azeri energy
resources is significant due to the capacity of these states to affect Azeri energy policy.
Baku authorities are also aware of the power that foreign oil companies have in the
exploitation and export of Azeri oil and gas to international markets, as is the case with
British Petroleum, which operates the major Azeri pipelines and oil and gas fields.
Therefore, the Azeri government has to maintain good relationships with all its major
economic partners and investors (the US, the UK, and Russia), and its transit states (Russia,
Georgia, Turkey, and Iran), creating a balance among regional and global powers in order
to achieve stability and economic prosperity.
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The competition between global powers, namely the US and Russia, for influence in
the South Caucasus region also affects the development of Azeri foreign policy. Azerbaijan,
as a landlocked state, needs economic and military partners to strengthen its independence
from Russia, balancing the regional and global powers in the Caucasus. The US-Russia
competition for influence in the South Caucasus region created two groups: pro-Western
states and non-pro-Western states. The first group, led by the US includes Western
European states, Turkey, and Georgia, while the second group, led by Russia, includes Iran
and Armenia.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new independent states of the Caucasus
region attempted to strengthen their economic and military independence from Russia by
seeking economic and military partnerships with the US. The exploitation and
commercialization of Azeri energy resources in the early 1990’s became the first reason for
American involvement in Azerbaijan.
Washington sponsored military and economic programs in the South Caucasus and
Caspian Sea regions because Azerbaijan represented a key strategic state for American
economic and military interests. As American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated,
the US has to diversify its energy suppliers from the Middle East, and it has to develop
economic, political, and military ties with countries like Azerbaijan, which has a strategic
location which is rich in oil and gas.
By developing economic, political, and military ties with Azerbaijan, Washington not
only diminished Russia’s hegemonic position in the energy trade, but it also sought to
contain the increasing interest of Iran in Azeri energy resources. The American
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involvement in Azerbaijan relies not only on the bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and
the US government, but also on multilateral relations between Azerbaijan and international
organizations, such as NATO and the OSCE, which indirectly increase the influence of
Washington in the South Caucasus region through economic and military support. These
American approaches, bilateral and multilateral, provide significant freedom to
Washington to shift its foreign policy with Azerbaijan without engaging in meaningful
commitments.
On the non-pro-Western side, Russia has been the principal energy supplier for
European states for decades, and it has increased Moscow’s leverage over Western states.
The exploitation and export of Azeri oil and gas to Western markets and the American
incursion in the Azeri energy industry threaten Russia’s hegemonic position as a supplier
of oil and gas to Western markets. The development of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline for
transporting oil and the South Caucasus Pipeline for transporting gas are clear examples of
the pro-Western energy policy developed by the Azeri government.
However, Russia committed itself to regaining its status as an unchallengeable
economic and military power in the South Caucasus. The Russia-Georgia War in August
2008 represented a clear example of how Moscow’s military power overwhelms Western
economic and military aid to the Caucasus states. It also depicted how committed Russia is
to extending its influence in the region through either cooperative policies and soft power
or coercive means and hard power.
The presence of Western states and companies in Azerbaijan increased Russian
concerns about Western economic and security expansion into the Russian sphere of
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influence. In order to increase Russia’s leverage in these regions, Moscow designed a
bilateral and multilateral policy where supranational organizations, such as the Russia-led
CIS, played a key role in the affairs of Central Asia and the Caucasus.
In the security aspect, Russia supported Armenia during the military conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This Russian approach increased the
Azeri mistrust of Moscow, and it divided the regional powers’ support regarding
Azerbaijan. Turkey gave military and economic support to Azerbaijan by providing
weapons and closing the Turkish-Armenian border, while Iran initially supported Armenia
and then took diplomatic measures to mediate in the conflict.
The geographic location of Russia provides Moscow with a significant power over
the landlocked territory of Azerbaijan, which is compelled by its geography to maintain
close relations with Russia. Azerbaijan has to keep outstanding relations with Moscow in
particular because Russia has an integrated pipeline system for transporting Azeri oil and
gas to Western markets, and the military capability to initiate a military confrontation with
any neighbor-state, as happened in 2008 with Georgia.
Therefore, since Russia is ready to increase its influence in Azerbaijan’s energy
business and regain its position as an unchallengeable global power, Baku has to keep a
close relationship with Moscow, balancing the regional and global powers in order to
consolidate economic development and military stability. This means that Azeri foreign
policy is affected by Russian economic and military measures in the South Caucasus region.
In brief, this research work has demonstrated that Azerbaijan’s landlocked
geography, its energy resources, and the global powers’ competition for influence in the
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South Caucasus affect the independence of Azeri foreign policy. Thus, the Azeri government
has to keep excellent relationships with its principal economic partners and investors (the
US, the UK, and Russia), and its transit states (Russia, Georgia, Turkey, and Iran), balancing
the power among regional and global powers in order to achieve political stability and
economic prosperity.
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